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Abstract 
Traditionally, family is treated as a single entity and is represented by a single utility 
function, even though it is formed by several individuals. In the past two decades, 
models that take care of individual decisions within the family emerge, and one of 
them is the collective model. By only assuming Pareto efficiency achieved within the 
family with certain assumptions on individual preferences, the collective approach 
enables us to identify how resources are shared within the family. 
In this thesis, intra-household allocation in urban China is analyzed. First, individual 
wage and labor supply equations are estimated as a preliminary analysis. Second, a 
household labor supply model is estimated following Chiappori et al. (2002). A 
sharing rule is retrieved according to the collective framework. Third, with the 
formulation of the collective household model of Fong and Zhang (2001)， 
identification of spousal, as well as individual private leisure, is performed. 
The estimation results show that certain distribution factors, which only affect 
relative power in the bargaining between household members but not individual 
-preference or household budget constraints, do matter in intra-household allocation. 
These factors include spousal difference in non-labor income, education, age, 
parental support at marriage and the sex ratio. This casts some doubts on the 
traditional unitary model and implies that intra-household bargaining may be 
important in the allocation process. Moreover, restrictions imposed by the collective 
models cannot be rejected statistically; thus, the collective models can gain more 
empirical support. It is also found that spousal leisure is negatively related to both of 
the couple's wages and total non-labor income, while their individual leisure both 
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Traditionally, a family is usually treated as a single entity and is represented by 
a single utility function, though it is formed by several individuals. Such models 
are known as unitary models. Unitary models can be rationalized if all individuals 
of the family possess the same preference on consumption of every member of the 
family, or the family is controlled by an altruistic dictator (such as Becker's Rotten 
Kid Theorem, see Becker, 1991). Basically, these require altriusm within the family 
in special forms. The advantage of unitary model is that it provides a simple frame-
work for analyzing household behavior under variations in policies and demographic 
factors. 
However, the unitary models have several serious limitations. First, they im-
ply that household resources are pooled between all household members, since each 
member's income plays the same role in the household budget constraint. Never-
theless, many empirical studies reject this hypothesis, for example, Schultz (1990), 
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Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997), Browning et al. (1994) and Fortin and Lacroix 
(1997). Second, it violates the methodological rule of individualism in microe-
conomic analysis, in which modelling should start with multi-utility framework 
(Browning et al , 1992). Third, the literature of social choice, pioneered by Ar-
row (1951), shows that there does not exist a general rule to aggregate individual 
preference to form a collective preference. This literature suggests that it is diffi-
cult to rationalize a household preference under heterogeneous members within a 
household. 
In view of these limitations of the unitary models, models that take into account 
individual decisions within a family of heterogeneous agents emerge in the past two 
decades. These include cooperative bargaining models (e.g. McElory and Horney, 
1981, Manser and Brown, 1980 and Lunberg and Pollak, 1993), non-cooperative 
bargaining models (e.g. Ulph, 1988) and collective models (e.g. Chiappori, 1988). 
In this thesis, the collective model is employed. A collective model may be viewed as 
a kind of cooperative bargaining model. The major difference between a collective 
model and a cooperative bargaining model is that the former does not impose any 
structure of the bargaining process while the latter does. 
Pioneered by Chiappori (1988)，by only assuming Pareto efficiency in resources 
allocation within a household, the collective approach not only provides certain 
testable restrictions on household demand functions, but it also enables us to iden-
tify how resources are shared within the household through the observation of in-
dividual's labor supply or individual's consumption of a good. Several theories of 
collective approach have been developed since Chiappori (1988). Each has its spe-
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cific context. Chiappori (1988, 1992) develop the theory and Chiappori, Fortin and 
Lacroix (2002) perform empirical studies for household labor supply under collective 
approach. Browning et al. (1994)，Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) 
and Browning and Chiappori (1998) develop and perform empirical tests for alloca-
tion of resources with consumption data of certain goods. Apps and Rees (1997), 
Chiappori (1997) and Aronsson, Daunfeldt and Wikstrom (2001) investigate the 
collective model in the area of household production. Extension to children as a 
household public good is developed recently by Bourguignon (1999) and Chiappori, 
Blundell and Meghir (2001). One more interesting work is by Fong and Zhang (2001) 
about retrieving individual and spousal leisure from the estimated equations of labor 
supply and consumption of an assignable good. As collective approach is employed 
in this thesis, some more details on the literature about the collective approach to 
household behavior are reviewed in the next chapter. 
Family values traditionally play a very important role in individual decisions. 
The shame and glory of any particular household member can affect the whole 
family and the male heads of the family traditionally have a say on all member's 
behaviour. It is also interesting to understand more about the changing behaviour 
of Chinese households under the ongoing economic reform. A new household survey 
provides a good opportunity for investigating household behavior in urban China. It 
was performed in 2002 and so, very recent situation can be revealed. Besides, each 
member's hours of work and individual consumption of certain consumption goods 
are both available, which cannot be found in most household surveys in China. Thus 
this new dataset enables us to investigate household decisions both in terms of labor 
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supply and consumption. 
Since labor supply information is not commonly available in urban household 
surveys in China, labor supply equation is rarely estimated for urban China^. Thus 
this study will also provide another labor supply estimation of residents in urban 
China which is relatively rare in the literature. Moreover, it is the first time collective 
model is applied to analyze Chinese household behavior. Finally, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is the first attempt to identify spousal leisure with household data. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review on the related 
research on collective approach to household bahavior. Chapter 3 discusses the 
source and characteristics of the dataset used in this study. Preliminary analysis 
on individual wage equations and individual labor supply equations is presented in 
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5，a simple household labor supply model following Chiappori 
6t al. (2002) is estimated and a sharing rule is retrieved up to an additive function 
of preference factors. In Chapter 6，the collective approach proposed by Fong and 
Zhang (2001) is implemented. Spousal, as well as individual private leisure, can be 
retrieved under certain assumptions up to an additive function of preference factors. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. 




In this study, the collective model of household behavior is employed. Here, a brief 
literature review is presented of previous work on the collective model. Within 
the literature of the collective household models, there are two main types. One 
type involves both time and consumption allocation of the household and in some 
cases involving household production. Another type involves only the allocation of 
consumption goods, taking the labor supply as given. 
2.1 Pioneering Work 
The two pioneering works of the collective approach to household behavior are Chi-
appori (1988) and (1992). Both are about "collective labor supply." For simplicity, 
only households with two members are considered. In his 1988 work, Chiappori 
defines collective rationality (CR) as the household decisions on allocation of leisure 
(labor supply) and good consumption being Pareto Efficient. In this model he con-
5 
siders the labor supply of the two people as well as a composite consumption good 
consumed by each of them in the household. First, egoistic agents are considered, 
where utility of oneself only depends on the consumption and leisure of one's own, 
that is IP = f(L\C^). Then, he derives some necessary conditions for the labor 
supply functions to be consistent with the collective rationality. He then derives 
similar restrictions using non-parametric methods. The main point of this article is 
that collective rationality does impose some restrictions on the observed behavior of 
household, which are independent of the "neoclassical" Slutsky-type conditions. 
In his later work, Chiappori (1992) demonstrates how information about the 
labor supply of individual household members is sufficient to recover the sharing rule 
of the household up to an additive constant, which means that all partial derivatives 
of the sharing rule can be obtained. Here the sharing rule refers to the amount of non-
labor income obtained by one of the members of the household. The other will get 
the remaining share. He shows that if individual's utility is egoistic and household 
decision is Paxeto Efficient, then a sharing rule exists. In turn the household decision 
process can be modelled as a two-stage process: (i) members first determine how 
much each member can share on the total amount of non-labor income, according to 
the sharing rule; (ii) given the sharing rule, each member optimally chooses one's own 
labor supply and consumption. He works out the conditions of identification and the 
partial derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to wages and non-labor income in 
terms of the derivatives of the labor supply functions. Besides sharing rule, indirect 
utility of each individual is also identified up to an increasing transformation. In 
general, identification requires second order derivatives (non-linearity) of the labor 
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supply functions, which may not be very robust. In later works, the identification 
can be simplified by introduction of distribution factor and more robust first order 
identification can be performed. 
Finally, Chiappori has extended his framework to caring preference. Caring 
preference is the preference in which each member's utility is expressed in the form 
C^)), so each people's preference depends on one's own and the 
spouse's direct egoistic utility, and U^ is increasing in both v^ and v^ for i = 1,2. 
In such a caring utility, the subutility functions involved are the same for 
both members and it assumes separability between two people's consumption and 
leisure. Thus no direct externalities of one's consumption on others is allowed under 
caring preference. He has proved that any decisions that is Paxeto Efficient with 
caring utility must also be Paxeto Efficient with egoistic utility. Thus all the results 
.’ previously developed can be applied in the caring case. 
The caring preference turns out to be a crucial assumption if we want to analyze 
the household decision making as a two-stage process under a sharing rule. However, 
it also imposes an extra restriction on the preference of individuals besides assuming 
household decisions being Pareto Efficient. This restriction can be restrictive in a 
sense that the consumption-leisure choice of one person has to be separable to other's 
consumption-leisure choice. 
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2.2 Collective Household Consumption 
2.2.1 Bourguignon et al. (1993). 
The first empirical work in collective framework is Bourguignon et al. (1993). This 
study is of the second type where only consumption of goods are available but 
not for labor supply. Thus labor supplies are assumed to be fixed and empirically, 
they select only those households with both husband and wife being full time wage-
earners. The dataset they used is from French and they estimate household demand 
for nine kinds of commodities. Though they employ caring preference and define the 
sharing rule of the total family income, they do not explicitly retrieve the sharing 
rule. They first test the income pooling hypothesis by putting both total income and 
individual incomes into the consumption function and testing for the significance of 
, t h e latter terms. The second thing they do is to derive certain restrictions under 
the collective framework and test if they can be rejected. The first restriction is 
the constant ratio of marginal propensity to consume with respective to two sources 
of income. The other is a second-order differential equation which is similar to the 
Slutsky type restriction. They can reject income pooling hypothesis，but cannot 
reject the restrictions imposed by collective approach. 
2.2.2 Browning et al. (1994) 
The second important paper is Browning et al. (1994). Their major contribution is 
that they derive the sharing rule, retrieve it empirically with Canadian household 
consumption data and introduce distribution factors into the collective framework 
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to ease the identification process. 
It considers only the consumption of a two-member household, given their labor 
supply fixed. The focus of the paper is different from the previous one by that 
it also recovers the sharing rule of the household income. In order to do so, one 
sufficient condition is to observe one good with the knowledge about its individual 
level of consumption, rather than only the household level of consumption. Under 
the framework of fixed labor supply, it is fulfilled by observing an assignable good, of 
which the consumption from each member of the household can be observed. It can 
also be fulfilled by observing one exclusive good for each person, where an exclusive 
good is a good consumed only by one member of the household. In Browning et al. 
(1994), men's and women's clothing are taken as the two exclusive goods required. 
In this paper, preferences are assumed to be caring. Public goods are allowed, 
‘provided that each member's subutility function is separable between public and 
private consumptions. With the above two assumptions and the key assumption of 
Pareto efficiency, there exists a sharing rule of the household income net of public 
good consumption £ind the household allocation problem can be treated as a two-
stage process. At the first stage, the total income y is divided to savings, public 
consumption and individual consumptions x^ and x^. Then individuals with income 
0：A and x^ allocate their income to their own private consumption. Here ，x^ are 
known as the sharing rules. With the separability assumption, the decision of private 
consumption is independent of the choice of public consumption, thus information 
of the level of public expenditure is not required as long as the total household 
expenditure on the private goods is available. 
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The sharing rule depends on distribution factors z and total private expenditure 
X. Distribution factors z are factors affecting the distribution between the couple, 
but not individual preference or household budget constraint. This vector can in-
clude individual incomes as well as "extra-environmental parameters" as proposed 
by McElroy (1990). These include sex ratio in the marriage market, laws concerning 
divorce and child support, changes in tax status associated with different marital 
status and also the ability of women to return to their natal home or to work outside 
home. ‘ 
With at least one distribution factor, identification of sharing rule can be done in 
first order derivatives of the consumption demand functions of the exclusive goods, 
which can be more robust than using second order derivatives. More restrictions 
on collective model can be derived from the equality of second order partial cross 
-derivatives of the derived sharing rule. 
Equally important is the empirical section. There are some restrictions made 
on the samples. First, only married couples with no others in the household are 
used. Second, both of the couple have to work full time so that their labor supply 
is exogenous. Finally, they also assume that selection to this group is exogenous. 
There are three potential sources of unobservable heterogeneity across households 
in the cross-section: the sharing rule and the two individual preferences. In this 
paper, the usual approach of just adding an error term into each demand equation 
is used. 
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For estimation, the following functional forms are used: 
In ⑷ = a o + ol'xy^ + ln(;zu) + aq{\n{xA))^  
In ⑷ = + + 
where A refers to women and B refers to men, a, 6 refers to the expenditure on 
women and men's clothing respectively and are the vectors of preference 
factors which affect individual's demand directly^. The sharing rule is specified as 
follows: 
"(z，工) = l + e 制 • 
where 
他 X) = 2((^ o + 7'z + 01n x) 
^A = P(Z,X) 'X 
Xb = [1 - p{z,x)] • X 
The data used are drawn from the Canadian family expenditure (FAMEX) sur-
veys conducted in 1978, 1982，1984 and 1986. These give the annual expenditures 
of consumption goods, so that the problem of "infrequency of purchase" can be 
reduced. For the total private expenditures, they take in the following items: cloth-
ing, food, alcohol, tobacco, services and recreation. On the other hand, lumpiness 
^ Since in cross sectional observations, good prices faced by all individuals are the same, thus 
price here is omitted in the estimation. However, in their empirical section, as they pool obser-
vations from surveys for a few years, they have put certain price indices in the vector y^ and 
y丑. 
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of purchase can still induce endogeneity problem between total expenditure and ex-
penditure on clothing, so an instrumental variable estimation method is used. The 
seemingly unrelated regression equation system technique is used in estimating the 
demand for clothing of husband and wife. Clothing demand for single persons are 
also estimated for comparison. 
Their major empirical findings are as follows: first, individual income variables 
matter in demand equations of couples but not for single after conditioning total 
expenditure, which is inconsistent with the unitary model. Second, the only factors 
that seem to affect the sharing rule are the difference in ages and difference in 
incomes of the couple and the total expenditure of the household. The effect of 
total expenditure is the largest among the three factors. 
,2.2.3 Some Other Developments 
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) 
Unlike Browning et al. (1994), Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995) focus 
on the theoretical development of collective consumption model for the use in em-
pirical studies. This paper introduces how the collective approach can work through 
conditional demands and derives restrictions on demand functions and how identi-
fication can be done with different assumptions and availability of information. 
Conditional demand is to put consumption level of one good into the consump-
tion function of another good. One important property of conditional demand is 
that, the conditional demand function should be independent of the distribution 
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factors, because all information from the distribution factors should have been sum-
marized in the conditioned good. It is because in a two-person household, the Pareto 
frontier is only one-dimensional. 
This paper also summarized the conditions implied by collective model under 
various information availability. Collective model impose restrictions on demand 
equations, but no sharing rule of a particular person can be derived if only aggre-
gate consumption of certain goods are observed. Sharing rule can be retrieved if 
information of at least one exclusive good is observed. 
Browning and Chiappori (1998) 
Another paper on collective household consumption is Browning and Chiappori 
(1998). They give a general characterization of collective household allocation and 
„ perform some empirical tests. The major task performed in this paper is not the 
identification of a sharing rule. Rather they intend to derive some restrictions on 
collective household demand and to test them with empirical data. As it is a gen-
eral characterization, no further assumptions other than Pareto efficiency is made, 
thus no egotistic or caring preference is assumed and externality of consumption is 
allowed. Another difference is that it allows variation in good prices in modelling. 
First they derive conditions that a general collective consumption model should 
satisfy. One major result is that the pseudoSlutsky matrix should be the sum of 
a symmetric matrix and a matrix of at most rank 1. This is known as the SRI 
condition. It can only be tested when there are at least 5 goods. 
They also carry out empirical study to implement the tests above. The data 
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used in this study is the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) of some 
years between 1974 and 1992. For sample selection, single males, single females 
and couples with no one else in the household are used. Besides, to allow for non-
separability between goods and leisure, they only select those agents who are in full 
time employment. 
The budget share equations are specified as a QUAIDS demand system. De-
mand for eight nondurable goods are estimated: food at home, food outside home, 
household operations, men's clothing, women's clothing, transport, recreation and 
vices(tobacco and alcohol). Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted by adding a het-
eroskedastic error term to each equation. Total expenditure is instrumented to allow 
for endogeneity due to clumsiness of purchase and measurement error. 
For empirical findings, first, they find that the restrictions of unitary model are 
‘ no t rejected for single person households, but highly significantly rejected for cou-
ples, which implies the unitary model is inappropriate for multi-person households. 
Besides, exclusion of individual income variables are rejected, so the distribution fac-
tors like individual incomes do affect consumption behavior. Moreover, symmetry 
of Slutsky matrix is rejected but SRI is not, which gives more credence on collective 
approadi to household behavior. 
Bourguignon (1999) 
In this paper, a collective model is further extended to include children as a pub-
lic good. Now assume parents have caring preference and take into account the 
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consumption of children in the following way: 
where A and B refer to adults and C refers to children. Here the decision makers 
are still only the parents, but they take into account of children's subutility function 
in their utility. The subutility function for children are the same for both parents, 
which means both parents have the same marginal rate of substitution between the 
goods consumed by their children. As in Browning et al. (1994), under Pareto 
efficiency, the process can be understood as a two-stage budgeting process. With 
the first stage the household collectively determines how much to spend on private 
consumption for each of the parents and children. Then in the second stage, the 
following decentralized decisions are made: 
t* 
s.t. p'x] = a 
max s.t. p'x^ = 
X召 
•• s.t. p'xC = y - a - ^ 
xC 
where a and ^ are the sharing function, which are functions of total income y, 
individual incomes and other distribution factors. The share of children thus can be 
retrieved if a and /3 can be retrieved. 
The author has derived the identification in 2 cases: three exclusive goods (one 
for eax:h individual) and a triangular case (for example, good 1 is consumed by A, 
good 2 is consumed by A and B and the last good is consumed by all people) with 
the use of conditional demand functions. 
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2.3 Household Production 
Another major development of this field of studies is the incorporation of household 
production. Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) both extend the collective 
framework to handle household production. Under this framework, individual's time 
is divided into work, leisure and household production, with the household product 
(or domestic good) output depends on time input from both members of the family. 
Apps and Rees (1997) show that in general, sharing function cannot be retrieved by 
only estimating leisure demand and household labor supply functions. Only when 
the household production function is linearly homogeneous and the demands for 
leisure are independent of the price of domestic goods can the sharing function be 
fully identified up to a constant. On the other hand, Chiappori (1997) distinguishes 
two cases: one is that household products are marketable and the other case not. 
He shows that in marketable case, the sharing rule and individual consumption 
- c an be identified up to an additive constant. For the non-marketable case, further 
assumptions are needed to perform identification. 
Recently, Aronsson, Daunfeldt and Wikstrom (2001) try to empirically apply . 
the above model. They employ the Apps and Rees (1997) approach and assume 
that household production is subject to constant return to scale. Non-linear least-
square estimation is employed to estimate leisure demand equations and household 
work equations and endogeneity of wage rates is allowed by using instrumental 
variable estimation. Results show that income pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected 
statistically. The data also reject that the collective model in which household goods 
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can be traded against a collective model with non-tradable household goods. 
2.4 Tests between Unitary Model and Collective 
Model 
There are two main types of testable restrictions implied by unitary models. One 
is income pooling. Unitary model implies that income (or in labor supply frame-
work, non-labor income) are shared without regard to who obtain the income. Thus 
variation in who obtain the (non-labor) income does not affect household decision, 
given the total (non-labor) income. Another implication is that distribution factors 
should not affect household decision since they do not affect both preference and 
total income. Farthermore, another restriction implied by unitary model is that the 
“symmetry of Slutsky matrix must be satisfied. 
For collective model, without distribution factors, the labor supply or consump-
tion has to satisfy certain second-order differential equations. For example, they are 
stated in Chiappori (1992)，Bourguignon et al. (1995) and Browning and Chiappori 
(1998). If distribution factor exists, a proportionality condition implied by Pareto 
efficiency, as in Bourguignon et al. (1993), Chiappori et al. (2002), can also be 
tested. Finally, cross second order derivatives of the retrieved sharing rule can also 
be checked if it satisfies Young's Theorem. 
In nearly most of the empirical work, some tests of unitary model and collective 
model are performed, for example, Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. 
(1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Aronsson et al. (2001). One work 
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specifically do this task is Fortin and Lacroix (1997). They specify a system of labor 
supply functions of male and female member of the family as follows: 
一 aiWi + a2W2 + a^y + a^Vi + x^ki + 05 + ei 
aQWi + a7W2 + asV + ag^i + ^ 10 
一 + b2W2 + hy + 64^ 1 + X2k2 + 65 + 62 
+ hw2 + bsy + bgyi + 610 
where Wi,W2 are wages, y is household non-labor income, yi is male's non-labor 
income and ki，k。are some socio-demographic characteristics of the person. This 
specification is flexible enough so that both collective and unitary model can be 
allowed under some restrictions on parameters, but the drawback is that it is non-
linear in parameters. 
Wage rates and non-labor income are instrumented since they are suspected to 
be endogenous. They provide three reasons. First, the wage rate is calculated by 
,dividing the total wage income by hours of work, if the hours of work is subjected to 
error, the calculated wage rate will also be subject to error in an opposite direction. 
It induces spurious negative relation between wage and hours of work. Second, 
unobserved factors like taste of work may affect both hours of work and actual wage 
rate. Third, parts of the non-labor income received by each household member, such 
as saving income, may be endogenous to hours of work decision. 
In their paper, FIML is used. Heckman-type correction is also used to adjust 
for selectivity bias in wife's wage rate equation. The results show that income 
pooling and symmetry of cross effects, which are implied by unitary model, are 
generally rejected. The collective model is not rejected except for the sub-group of 
young couples with pre-school child. One plausible reason is that pre-school children 
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creates non-separability between goods consumed by parents, and thus the collective 
model so far cannot take this into account. 
2.5 Distribution Factors in Collective Labor Sup-
ply 
In a recent work, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), distribution factors are in-
troduced to the model of household labor supply. In this paper, they use sex ratio 
(reflecting the condition of the marriage market) and tightness of divorce law (re-
flecting cost of quitting marriage) as distribution factors. With distribution factors, 
the identification of sharing rule and testing of collective model can be greatly sim-
plified. The sharing rule can easily be identified with first order derivatives of the 
‘labor supply functions up to an additive function of preference factors^. The results 
thus can be more robust. Proportionality of the effect of distribution factors: 
dh^/dsk _ dhyOsk 
dh^/dsi = dh?/dsi 
where are husband and wife's labor supply respectively and Si are distribution 
factors, can also be easily tested. They also employ a simple functional form: 
= /o + /i log(u;i) + /2 log(t/;2) + /a \og{wi) log(it;2) + hy + fgS + fgZ 
= mo + mi log('u;i) + 7712 log(it;2) + ms log(wi) log(u;2) + m^yA + 11158 + mgZ 
2This is basically the same as before where the sharing rule can be retrieved "up to an additive 
constant". In previous papers, only a simplified model without considering the role of preference 
factors is used, but in Chiappori et al. (2002), preference factors also enter the picture. 
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which is linear in parameters. It saves some degrees of freedom than the functional 
form in Fortin and Lacroix (1997), and especially useful if sample size is not too 
large. This functional form also enables us to derive the sharing rule and tests of 
unitary and collective model in a relatively simple manner. 
Unlike in Fortin and Lacroix (1997), in Chiappori et al. (2002)3，there is no 
adjustment made for potential bias due to sample selection. The main reason they 
give is that the adjustment involves extension of the collective approach to handle 
corner solutions, which is out of the scope of the paper. 
The data used in their study is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
in the United States in 1988. The estimation method is full information GMM 
method which takes into account instrumental variable estimation, correlations be-
tween equations as well as heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Thus this can give an 
‘asymptotically more efficient estimator than 3SLS and FIML. The empirical results 
shows the followings: (1) efficiency hypothesis cannot be rejected; (2) distributive 
factors do affect household decisions, which rejects unitary models. It is found that 
both an increase in proportion of male or passage of a divorce law favorable to 
women will increase transfer from husband to wife. 
2.6 Identification of Spousal Leisure 
Besides identification of sharing rule, Fong and Zhang (2001) decompose leisure into 
private leisure and public or spousal leisure. Private leisure is the time a member 
3 Note that the two authors of the former are also the coauthors of the latter. 
20 
spent on one's own or with people other than the spouse. Public leisure is the time 
spent with the spouse together, thus it is also called spousal leisure. As Fong and 
Zhang (2001) mention, spousal leisure can reflect the stability of the marriage which 
deserve more attention in research. 
They have an interesting finding that, by observing one assignable good and each 
member's labor supply in a two-person household, the amount of spousal leisure, as 
well as individual private leisure, can be identified up to an additive constant (or an 
additive function of the preference factors). If total household private expenditure 
is also observed, the sharing rule can also be recovered. The key to identification 
is that, under the assumption of caring preference, ratios of a quasi-sharing rule 
derivatives can be estimated by the derivatives of the assignable goods demand 
functions. Then the derivatives of private leisure, spousal leisure and sharing rule can 
‘be obtained and solved by taking derivatives of certain identities. This development 
provides a very useful application of the collective model in analyzing the welfare of 
family members in terms of different types of leisure one can enjoy. 
2.7 Plan of the thesis 
In this thesis, the methodology of the last two sections in this review is mainly 
adopted. The collective model used in Chiappori et al. (2002) is employed to 
analyze the household allocation in urban China. The development of identification 
of private and spousal leisure by Fong and Zhang (2001) will then be used. 
In the following chapters, before applying collective approach, basic analysis with 
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the data on Chinese households is performed. Data descriptions are presented in 
the next chapter, while individual wage and labor supply equation estimations are 




3.1 Data Collection Process 
The dataset used in this thesis research is from a household survey recently con-
'ducted in China. Funded by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong, the survey 
was carried out by the Urban Survey Unit of the State Statistical Bureau during 
June and July, 2002, in five cities of China. The questionnaire was carefully de-
signed by Mark Rosenzweig, Junsen Zhang and Pak-wai Liu in close consultation 
with Chinese experts in the State Statistical Bureau. Adult twins aged from 18 
to 65 were identified by the local Statistical Bureau through various channels, in-
cluding colleagues, friends, relatives, newspaper advertising, neighborhood notices, 
neighborhood management committees, and household records in the public security 
bureau. Overall, these channels are more or less equal in probability for all twins 
in a city, and in this sense, the twins sample we obtained may be rather random. 
The survey was conducted with extraordinary care, including several site checks 
23 
by experts from the State Statistical Bureau and Junsen Zhang. With appropriate 
discussion with Mark Rosenzweig, Pak-wai Liu and other experts, data input was 
closely supervised and monitored by Junsen Zhang during the months of July and 
August, 2002. The non-twin sample was taken from the so-called regular households 
with which the Urban Survey Unit of the State Statistical Bureau conducts regular 
monthly survey of their own. Questionnaires were completed through household 
face-toface personal interviews. 
3.2 Data Characteristics 
In this data set, we have household economic information for respondents in 5 major 
cities including Chengdu, Chongqing, Haerbin, Hefei and Wuhan. Altogether there 
are 4683 observations, in which 3012 observations are twins and 1671 are non-twins. 
All the adult twins are interviewed separately as they have already formed their own 
‘families. Thus for each pair of twins we have two distinct observations, which can 
be matched by the household code. As shown in Table 3.1, the largest portion of the 
samples comes from Wuhan, which is up to 50% for twins and 30% for non-twins^. 
In this study, the following sample selection rules are used. First, since we inten-
sively deal with income, those observations with incomplete income information are 
excluded. Second, to reduce sample selection problem for studying and retirement, 
we only use sample with age between 25 to 60. Third, to be consistent to later 
1 In this sample, over two thirds are from twins. It should be noted that the twin sample may 
not be completely representative. 
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work following the approach of Chiappori et al. (2002)，in which sample selection 
adjustment is not made, only those with both positive working hours and positive 
wage income are included in estimating all wage and hours of work equations in this 
thesis. 
In what follows, males and females are treated separately. We have altogether 
2989 working males and 2186 working females with complete information in income, 
hours of work and certain key variables like age and education. Within this sample, 
we can also have certain subsamples defined from different aspects. Three major 
subsamples are respondents, married and unmarried. Since in this survey, we mainly 
interview one member of the main couple of the household^, and due to questionnaire 
design, some variables are available only for respondents. The most particularly 
useful variables in this group are language ability and true work experience. The 
‘other two are divided according to the marital status, which will be useful in later 
analysis. The married sample provides some guidelines for the specifications in 
later parts concerning married couples with both of them working. The unmarried 
sample gives us some comparison between factors affecting individual and household 
decisions.3 
A list of variable definitions is shown in Table 3.2 and some summary statistics of 
major variables used in the individual wage and labor supply equations in the next 
2 For example, for twin sample, the repsondent is the twin person, who is not necessarily the 
household head. 
3Twins property of the sample is not our focus in this paper, thus twins and non-twins are not 
treated as another two separate samples here. We have tried to find ways of incorporating twins 
property in the collective approach but so far no good idea has come out yet. 
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chapter for various samples axe shown in Table 3.3 and 3.4. For two of our major 
concerns, hours of work and wages, the mean of hours of work is around 192 hours 
a month in male sample, which is around 45 hours a week. It is just slightly lower 
for females. The standard deviation is around 52 hours a month for both males and 
females, and the monthly hours of work can be up to 400 hours a month for some 
workers, showing a large variation in working hours. 
The mean wage for males is around 6.3 yuans per hour while that of females 
is 22% lower at about 4.95 yuans per hour. Across samples, married people have 
slightly higher wages while unmarried people have lower wages. This may partly 
be explained by age of these two groups. Married sample is slightly older than the 
overall sample while unmarried sample are much younger than the overall sample. 
(It is particularly obvious for males as mean age of married and unmarried samples 
“differs by over 11 years.) Since a higher age implies a higher work experience, higher 
productivity is expected for married sample than for single sample on average. The 
mean age of overall sample is 40 for males and 38 for females. 
Another interesting thing is the marital status. In the male sample, 88% are 
married while in the female sample, 92% of them are married. The married people 
in respondent sample in each gender consists of a smaller proportion, which is only 
78% for males and 88% for females. More interesting to note is about the distribution 
of divorced people in various samples. Here 'divorced' people also included those 
widowed. In the overall and respondent sample, only about 1 to 2% for males and 4 
-6% for females are 'divorced'. What is interesting to note is that for the unmarried 
sample, for males, only about 10% have married before, while for females, over half 
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of them have married before. 
The mean years of education are around 12 years for both males and females, 
which is about higher secondary and vocational training level*. Single samples have 
a slightly higher education, probably because young people tend to have a higher 
level of education. The difference between the year of education of males and females 
is indeed very little in our sample. 
For number of children, under the current one-child policy, the number of children 
is relatively small. Only 14% of working males and females having a children below 
the age of 6, while 38% and 44% of working males and females have children between 
7 to 17 years of age. There are still some people having children in the unmarried 
sample, mainly because they are divorced or they give birth before marriage. There 
are just a little less than a quarter of people being the communist party members, 
‘while only around 1% of the working samples are from ethnic minority. 
The city distribution of the sample are similar to that in the overall sample, 
with Wuhan consists of around 40% of the sample, with the other four cities about 
15% each. For female sample, there are slightly more from Haerbin and less from 
Wuhan. For work unit, in this survey, there are over 60% of the workers are employed 
in state-own units. Private sector still employs only a small portion of employees. 
Some information is only available for the respondent of each household. First, 
it includes the two language abilities, Putonghua (Mandarin) and a foreign language 
(no particular language specified). The language level for females is slightly higher 
•^ The year of education is converted from level of education one has finished. The conversion 
rule is shown in Table 3.2. 
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than that of males for both Putonghua and foreign language. Another variable 
available for respondent is the year of full time (actual) work experience since 16 
years of age. It is found that it is lower than the potential work experience, which is 
calculated by age minus years of education minus 6, by around 2 years. Surprisingly, 
the true year of work experience is not particularly low for females, reflecting, at 
least in the past, that the female participation rate is very high even they need to 
take care of the family^. 
Two issues are worth taking a deeper look into the data. One is about partici-
pation and the other is about the non-labor income. Some figures on participation 
are shown in Table 3.5. If we consider the participation rate, which is the number 
of people who are working or available for work^ over the total population in the 
specified age range?，the participation rate for males is about 90% while that of 
-females is about 75%-80%. However, it is not the sample that we can use to esti-
mate wage and labor supply equations. As we can see, there is a large discrepancy 
between those in labor force and those who report complete information on wage 
and hours of work. The large discrepancy can be due to unemployment, inaccuracy 
or reluctance in reporting relevant income information. After taking a deeper look 
at the data, the unemployment should be the main cause of this large gap as there 
OAs noted in Li and Zax (2002), the participation rate for female is just slightly lower than that 
of male in urban China in 1995. 
bThose who are in labor force are defined as those who report their working status as working 
or unemployed. Other working status categories include being full time students, retired people, 
household workers and others. 
7 Here we use 25-60. 
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are as many as 10% of workers are now reported as unemployed. 
Another feature of the data worth noticing is about the report of non-labor in-
come. Non-labor income here include property income like rental income, interest 
income and dividend income, and transfer income like parent's transfer, unemploy-
ment allowance and retirement income. It is found that only very few people have 
reported a positive non-labor income. Prom Table 3.6a, there are only less than 10% 
of people reporting some positive non-labor income in the previous month. One pos-
sible reason is that since China is under development and undergoing reformation 
from a socialist economy, private asset holding is still limited, and thus property 
income is little. Besides, transfer, say those from parents, may not be received as 
frequently as monthly, thus there may be infrequency problem in this non-labor in-
come measure. A comparison with a similar dataset, namely the Urban Household 
-Survey of China 1999 conducted by the State Statistical Bureau, shows that the 
proportion of people reporting a positive non-labor income is around 15% and the 
amount is about $1400 per year out of those with positive non-labor income, which 
is about $110-120 per month. Obviously, the dataset with a yearly measure gives a 
higher percentage of positive non-labor income and a lower level of monthly average. 
Thus infrequency problem is probable. 
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Chapter 4 
Individual Wage and Labor 
Supply Equations 
In this section, some preliminary investigations in individual wage and hours of 
work are performed. This can give us some basic ideas of the wage and hours of 
‘ w o r k structure for urban Chinese individuals and give us some guidelines for the 
specifications for further investigations in the next two chapters. 
4.1 Individual Wage Equations 
4.1.1 Model Specification 
For wage equation, Mincer(1974) type specification is used: 
\og{wage) = ft) +13^education + 馬 exp erience + ^^ exp erience^ + (3'^X (4.1) 
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where wage refers to the hourly wage, education refers to the year of education 
and experience is the potential years of work, which is age 一 education - 6. X is 
a vector of control factors which may include marital status, number of children 
(pre-school and school age), communist membership, ethnic minority, self-evaluated 
health status, city dummies and types of employment unit. 
4.1.2 Results 
General Models 
Male and Female wage equations are estimated separately. First, we estimate a 
general model of wage equation with the sample of working males and females re-
spectively^ .Here the male sample has 2989 observations while female sample has 
2186 observations. The results of this general model are reported in Table 4.1. 
As is often being interpreted as the rate of return to education^ the rate of 
. return to education of Chinese household on average in these five cities are around 
9.8% and 11% for males and females respectively. For males, this estimate is similar 
to a recent study by Kung (2002) for 1999 data. For females, our estimate is a little 
bit lower than Kung's (which is about 14%), but it is similar to those of 1998^ The 
^The selection criteria are that they report they are working, and receive positive income and 
report positive hours of work. 
^ Since 久 = d \og{wage)/deducation = {dwage/wage)/deducati(m, it represents how wage 
changes in proportion to a one year increase in education, assuming that the cost of education 
equals the income forgone in the period one received this education. (See Berndt (1991), Chapter 
5，p. 162-163.) 
3 One difference between this study and Kung (2002) is that hourly wage is used here, while 
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rate of return is higher for females than for males, which can also be found in other 
developing countries, like Indonesia (Deolalikar, 1993). 
One characteristic of the estimated equation is that for male earning equation, 
the estimated effect of experience variables shows a U-shape, first falling and then 
turning back upward at around 7 years of experience. This may reflect that for 
initial years, experience is just accumulating and has little effect on wage, but its 
effect comes out eventually. It may also reflect age-cohort effect as it is based on 
one cross sectional survey. However, it is also noted that only the coefficient for 
experience squared is significant but not for experience itself. Thus we try to enter 
only experience without its square into the wage equations. It is found that the 
coefficient on experience becomes highly significant and the B? only lowers slightly 
for both male and female wage equations. Moreover, other parameters estimated 
-are also affected only slightly. Applying parsimonious principle, for wage equations 
thereafter only level of experience will be used. Under this specification, there is 
an increase of 0.8% and 0.6% on wage for one more potential year of experience for 
males and females respectively. 
For other variables, it is found that married males and females earn around 
10% and 4% more than single people respectively. One possible reason is that 
their financial responsibility from the family drives them to work harder. However, 
those who have children, especially school-age children, earn significantly less than 
total earnings is used in Kung. Besides, the specification of Kung that is used for comparison only 
includes years of education, years of potential experience and it square and province dummies. 
Other individual characteristic variables are not included. 
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those who have no children. It is probably because they have to divert their effort 
from work to take care of children. Communist members can have around 10% 
higher wages than non-members, while those who have poorer health earn less. City 
dummies are used to control for slightly different norms and prices and it is found 
that people in Chengdu earn a higher wage while people in Chongqing, Haerbin and 
Hefei generally earns a lower wage than the base city Wuhan. 
Further results of different specifications and subsamples 
Next we continue to investigate some different specifications of wage equations. 
The results are shown in Table 4.2. First, in first and fourth column, if all other 
variables are not controlled, the return to education and experience is slightly higher 
and highly significant. Second, in second and fifth column, education level dummies 
„ of whether father or mother attains upper secondary education or above are entered 
into the equation together with other variables used in the basic specification. It is 
found that father's education matters for both male and female wages, but mother's 
education only have., significant effect on female wages. Higher level of parental 
education affects the social status of the family as well as the quality of family 
education one can receive. These are important in determining individual quality 
and thus productivity. These variables will be useful as instruments in labor supply 
equations in later part of the study since it can significantly affect wage, but should 
not have direct effect on hours of work decision. 
In third and sixth column of Table 4.2, some employment unit and occupation 
dummies are entered into the equations. Two major findings follow. First, the rate 
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of return to education drops significantly, to around 6.5% and 5.8% for males and 
females respectively. One possible reason is that education and occupations and 
employment unit are highly correlated, and so highly educated people enters highly 
paid occupations, like managers or heads of working unit. Another finding is that 
the return to education becomes higher for males after controlling for employment 
units and a few highly paid occupations. It reflects that the differential in return to 
education is not within occupation, but rather it is in the difference in gender pre-
mium across different employment units and occupations. The estimated equation 
also reveals that workers in foreign-owned or joint venture with foreign companies 
(omitted dummy) is the best paid, in terms of hourly wage. Employees from sole 
proprietorship, private business and collective units are paid less. 
Some wage equations on married and unmarried subsamples are presented in 
‘Table 4.3. Due to small sample size, the unmarried equations estimated are gen-
erally less precise. The potential experience has a slightly negative effect on wage 
for unmarried men, though it is far from significant. One possible reason is that, as 
experience in initial years have slightly negative effect on male wages and single peo-
ple are mainly of younger ages, the experience in this subsample captures the initial 
downward part of the curve. Besides, the estimated return to education is slightly 
lower for both married and unmarried subgroup than whole sample, especially for 
unmarried group. Communists membeship, health status and parents' education 
also have a significant effect on wages. 
Since in our questionnaire, some questions are asked on respondents only. We 
would like to investigate those factors with the subsample of respondents only. These 
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variables include two language indicators: Putonghua (Mandarin) and foreign lan-
guage, and the reported actual years of work experience. The results are shown in 
Table 4.4. The first column shows the original model with regressors the same as 
in Table 4.3. In column two, when two language variables are added, the estimated 
coefficient on education drops by around 2% and both language variables are highly 
significant. It is interesting to find that after controlling language ability effect, the 
return to education is similar for males and females. One reason is that the return 
to foreign language is higher for females, while in general the language ability is 
better for females than for males. 
In the third column, actual work experience variables, level and its square, are 
used in plax:e of potential experience. It is found that the pattern of using actual 
years of working and potential years of working are quite similar, with a U-shaped 
‘effect for males and ordinary increasing in a decreasing rate effect for females. If only 
level of actual work experience is entered as shown in the fourth column, it becomes 
positive and highly significant. On the other hand，the rate of return to education 
falls when actual years of work experience is entered. It falls to only around 5%. 
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4.2 Individual Labor Supply Equation 
4.2.1 Model Specification 
The labor supply equations estimated in this section are in the following form, which 
is employed in Mroz (1987) and Li and Zax (2002): 
/li = ao + cki log—ape) + ot2yi + ci^ Zi + o^X (4.2) 
where hi is the hours of work for the individual, yi is the own non-labor income, Zi 
is the total income of the spouse. If the person is unmarried, Zi is set to zero so that 
only one's own non-labor income affects the person's decision.^ The vector X is a 
control variable vector which consists of similar variables as in the wage equations 
above. In this specification, the estimated uncompensated wage elasticity is ai/hi. 
In my study, I employ instrumental variable estimation with Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM) estimation method. Instrumental variable method is used be-
-cause it is suspected that wage and own non-labor income are endogenous. One 
reason for their endogeneity is because they are related to the past and present 
unobserved work preference of the person. A preference towards working enable 
the person to work more now and before. Working more before may lead to higher 
4 In some literature, the item y and 2 are combined to form the household total income minus the 
person's own labor income (like in Mroz (1987) and Li and Zax (2002)). Here, I have decomposed 
the income of those from this person, and those from the spouse to see if they have different effect. 
Since the survey is couple-based rather than household-based, only spouse's income is considered 
to be part of the family income. It is assumed that even other family members may have some 
income, they do not mix their income with this core couple and so their income can be neglected 
in the this couple's decision. 
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wage due to more experience and higher non-labor income due to higher income and 
higher savings before^. Thus the relationship of hours of work with wage and with 
non-labor income can be due to the unobserved factors. Besides, measurement error 
on wage, due to error in hours of work, may give rise to a spurious negative relation 
between hours of work and wage®. Spouse total income and children are also sus-
pected to be endogenous, especially in married sample, since they are also household 
decision variables. The excluded instruments used, without otherwise specified, are 
higher order polynomial (up to third order) of age and education, parents' education 
dummies, communist party membership and ethnic minority. On the other hand, 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation method is used because it can 
provide an asymptotically more efficient estimator than other conventional methods 
like 2SLS under heteroscadasticity of unknown form. 
- To be consistent to the later studies under the collective framework, following 
Chiappori et al. (2002)，sample selectivity adjustment is not made here. 
4.2.2 EmpiricW Results 
General Models 
First we estimate the hours of work equations for males and females samples respec-
tively. In Table 4.5a and Table 4.5b, results of both OLS and GMM estimations of 
3 It can also be due to unobserved preference on savings. 
6This is because our wage is obtained by dividing total wage income by total hours of work. 
If hours of work reported is larger than actual one, the calculated wage will be smaller than the 
actual one and vice versa. 
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labor supply equations of males and females are presented respectively. The first 
two columns are the models with own non-labor income (y) combined with spouse's 
income [z) as in Mroz (1987). The next two columns shows the results of models 
that treats the above two items separately. 
For instrumental variable GMM estimations, the endogenous regressors are log-
arithm of own wage and other household income or own non-labor income. Spouse 
total income is not instrumented in equation (4) and (8) because in this sample we 
include both married and unmarried individuals. For married individuals, spouse's 
properties can be used as instruments. However, for those unmarried, spouse vari-
ables are unavailable and it would be impossible if we include properties of spouse 
as instruments. 
In Table 4.5a and 4.5b, the first two columns show that the effect of unearned 
‘income with the combined measure {y -t- z) is positive for both males and females, 
even if it is instrumented. However, as shown in the third and fourth columns, if 
we disaggregate this into own non-labor income and the spouse's total income, it 
is quite clear that the effect on own non-labor income becomes negative, though 
not significant, while that of spouse's income is positive, and significant for males. 
One of the possible explanations, based on the collective approach, is that if the 
spouse gets more income, the spouse will have greater bargaining power in the family 
and one may want to increase one's own hours of work to earn more income and 
balance the power. Another possible interpretation is attributed to the unobserved 
factors of assortative mating, such as work preference and preference between goods 
and leisure. If both of the couple are hard-working or like to enjoy more good 
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consumptions than leisure, they both tend to work for longer hours, earn a higher 
income and enjoy less leisure?. 
Some tests are performed and results are shown in Table 4.5c. Over-identifying 
restriction test is done based on the minimized functional value of GMM estimation. 
The statistic is the Hensen J statistic which follows x^ distribution with degree of 
freedom equals to the number of over-identifying restrictions. It shows that the 
null of validity of instruments and over-identifying conditions cannot be rejected for 
all four GMM equations with p-values around 0.3 for males and 0.9 for females. 
Moreover, an exogeneity test of wage and household other income or own non-labor 
income is made in Wu-Hausman form®. In the second row of Table 4.5c, the test 
statistic shows that, the exogeneity of wage and other household income or own 
non-labor income can be rejected for females, but it cannot be rejected for males. 
. A s explained in Mroz (1987), there are two opposing effects of endogeneity affecting 
the wage rate estimates. First, it is the spurious correlation between wage rate 
and hours of work due to the calculation of the wage rate from hours of work, 
producing downward bias. Second, there may be other sources of endogeneity of 
7Spousal income is treated as exogenous. However, even if it is instrumented in married sub-
sample, the positive effect is still-there. 
8 As suggested in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), this test is better intrepreted as whether 
the coefficient estimates are affected by the endogenity of the specified endogenous variables. This 
can be done with an auxilary regression of the original OLS model by adding into the equation the 
predicted values of the suspected endogenous variables regressed on all instruments. We can test 
for the joint significance of the coefficients on these predicted values by F test. (See Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993), p.237-242.) 
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wage rate and hours of work, such as work preference, which may leads to an upward 
bias. If these two effects cancel out, then OLS will give similar estimates with 
instrumental estimation, which leads to a failure in rejecting the exogeneity of wage. 
As, for females, endogeneity of wage and own non-labor income does have effects on 
parameter estimates, we will continue to treat these two variables as endogenous in 
both males and females labor supply equations that follow for consistency. 
Third, we also test for exogeneity of spouse's income and children variables, 
given the endogeneity of wage and own non-labor income. These two variables 
are suspected to be endogenous because they are also the decision variables of the 
family, which is jointly determined with one's hours of work^. The Sargen C statistic 
is usedio. As shown in third row of Table 4.5c, their exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
Thus we can continue to treat these variables as exogenous. Finally, we have also 
.tested if spouse's income can be treated the same as the man's own non-labor income 
by Wald test. Since the estimated effect is not very strong, it cannot be rejected 
statistically, with p-value at around 0.17 for males and 0.86 for females. 
Back to the parameter estimates shown in Table 4.5a and Table 4.5b, for both 
males and females, the estimated wage effects are negative, that means the labor 
supply functions are downward sloping (or in backward bending portion). This can 
9 Spouse total income is directly related to the hours of work decision of the spouse, thus is also 
one of the decision variables of the household. 
lOThis is basically the difference in the J statistics of unrestricted (treating these as exogenous) 
and restricted (treating these as endogenous) models, following distribution with degrees of 
freedom equals to the number of the suspected endogenous variables being tested. (See Hayashi 
(2000), p.220) 
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be commonly found in male labor supply literature. (See for example Pencavel, 
1986, p.69 for a survey of estimated men wage elasticity.) However, it is much less 
common to appear in female labor supply. (See for example survey in Mroz, 1987.) 
It is also different from the results found by Li and Zax (2002) which shows that both 
male and female wage effects are positive. The wage effect for males is significantly 
negative at 10% in equation (4). The wage elasticity is higher in magnitude for 
males about -0.12 in specification (4) while it is -0.05 for females in specification 
(8). The negative wage effect for females is somewhat puzzling. One possibility 
is that Chinese people usually have higher family values and therefore household 
time becomes more attractive if they have enough income to support their daily 
expenses. An alternative explanation of negative wage effect on labor supply can be 
found in a recent paper by Lin (2003). If the cross substitution effect of work effort 
•• one pays and nominal hours of work are negative (perhaps to avoid being caught 
shirking) and higher wages induces a higher work effort, one may opt for working 
few hours when wage rate increases. This can also induce a negative relationship 
between hours of work and wage without an income effect. 
For other determinants of labor supply, married men tend to work longer, but 
those having children tend to work shorter to take care of family and children. The 
poorer the health, the shorter the working hours. State unit employees tend to work 
shorter while private business and sole proprietor firm workers tend to work much 
longer hours. For females, the estimated equation is not very robust. In specification 
(8)，the only significant factors are two employment units (private business and sole 
proprietorship). 
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Further results for different specifications and subsamples 
Table 4.6 shows the results of hours of work equations for unmarried and married 
samples. For the married sample, both own non-labor income and spouse's total 
income are instrumented by own and spouse related variables (see notes below Table 
4.6). Basically results are similar to previous estimations. Some special points are 
worth noting. First, for single males, the wage coefficient is slightly positive, but 
insignificant. However, wage coefficients for both female equations are negative but 
significant at the 5% level. Another finding is that the coefficient for own non-labor 
income for married female labor supply is positive, though insignificant, but that of 
spouse's income is slightly negative^. 
For the tests, all equations can pass the overidentifying restriction tests. Equality 
of effect from own non-labor income and spouse's total income cannot be rejected. 
Finally, exogeneity of children variables are not rejected, even in married samples in 
which whether to have children is one of the household decisions. This implies that 
in later work it is not necessary to treat children as an endogenous variable. 
Table 4.7 shows the results of estimated models using variables only available for 
the respondent sample. The results are once again puzzling as the effects from own 
non-labor income are all positive in this sample, which are greater than the effects 
from spouse's total income, although all these are insignificant statistically^^. This 
u Indeed，in Li and Zax (2002), their estimated effect of home asset on labor supply is insignifi-
cantly positive, though their estimated effect of household other income on labor supply is negative 
and significant in many cases. 
12 For males, the effect of own non-labor income becomes negative if own non-labor income is 
taken as exogenous. However, this is still negative if we do the same for females. 
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may be due to the imperfect measurement of non-labor income, which is discussed in 
the previous chapter. The focus of these specifications is the variables on language 
ability and actual work experience. For language ability, the estimated coefficients 
are generally insignificant, except that it is positively significant at only 10% level 
for Putonghua for females. As these language variables are highly significant in 
wage equation, and generally insignificant in hours of work equations, they are good 
instruments for wage in hours of work estimation. The third column is the estimated 
equation with these two language ability variables as instruments. It is evident that 
the standard errors in estimated wage coefficients axe smaller. 
Finally, actual work experience and its square are entered into the hours of work 
equations. Their coefficients are not significantly different from zero. If we put 
them as excluded instruments, the standard errors of wage and income variables are 
'further reduced. Mroz (1987) finds that actual work experience is not exogenous 
when it is put as an excluded instrument in their female labor supply equations. 
However, in our study, for both males and females, the exogeneity of actual work 
experience are not rejected, though the p-value is as high as 0.2 for females. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, some basic analysis of wage equations and hours of work equations 
are performed. The wage equations generally conform to what similar studies have 
found and the results are robust across subsamples. The estimated return to school-
ing is about 10%. However, if we need to concentrate on return to schooling, the 
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omitted ability bias has to be taken into account. Our data consists of twins data 
which can be used for this purpose. However, it is out of the scope of this thesis 
and it is left to future research. 
For labor supply equations, the estimated results do not conform to similar stud-
ies very well. Wage effects are generally negative, though in literature it is relative 
rare to find a negative wage effect for females. There are also cases in which own 
non-labor income has positive relation to hours of work even being instrumented. 
The estimates in labor supply functions are not precise as very few coefficients are 
statistically significant. These results may reflect that the conventional labor supply 
specifications do not match with Chinese labor supply situation very well. There 
may be segmented labor market with higher paid jobs usually associated with lower 
working hours, creating a negative relationship between wage and hours of work. 
"Moreover, there are still over 60% of workers employed in state-owned enterprises, 
and many people's job may still be assigned by the government^Thus the hours 
of work may not be flexible enough to be taken as free choices. In particular, this 
and other factors may induce non-linearity of the budget constraint. Therefore some 
complications and modifications of this simple model is worth being considered in 
further studies. To conform to the simple collective framework used in Chiappori et 
al. (2002)，we keep this simple analysis as a starting point. 
On the good side, we can find that children variables are generally not endogenous 
and can be treated as exogenous in later studies. Besides, it is also found that 
i3ln another dataset, namely the Chinese Household Income Project 1995, which is used by Li 
and Zax (2002), there are as many as 75% of workers having their jobs assigned by the government. 
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language ability variables can be good instruments as they are highly significant in 
wage equation but not in labor supply equations. 
In this chapter, only individual is taken into account. In the next two chapters, 
household allocation models will be used to investigate the household decisions. 
Under the collective framework introduced by Chiappori (1988), intra-household 
allocation can be revealed by estimating labor supply and consumption equations. 
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Chapter 5 
Collective Household Labor 
Supply 
In this section, we estimate the joint labor supply of husband and wife of households 
in urban China. Certain tests on unitary and collective models are performed and 
‘ t h e sharing rule of the household is recovered up to an additive function of preference 
fax:tors. In this chapter, the approach of Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) is 
employed. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first, a theoretical model is presented, which 
largely follows Chiappori et al. (2002). Then a parametric model is set up and 
parameters of the sharing rule are derived in terms of parameters of the labor supply 
functions. Finally, details of the estimation processes and the estimated labor supply 
and sharing functions are presented. 
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5.1 Theoretical Model 
Now assume every-household has two decision makers, husband and wife. Let h^ 
and h^ be the labor supply of husband and wife respectively. The labor supply is 
measured in hours within a month, which lies between zero and T. Leisure (L^ and 
L^) is the remaining time for each of the husband and wife, so = T - for i = 
A,B. Let be the aggregate consumption of husband and wife respectively. 
Each member of the household has a distinct utility function U^ and U^ and they 
make decision cooperatively so that Pareto efficiency is attained within a household. 
Each of the husband and wife has a caring preference and so, each of them 
care about each others through the subutility functions. Their consumption and 
leisure decisions are separable to each other. The utility functions can be writ-
ten as: and where V^ = V^ = 
,z) and z is a vector of preference factors, which affect individuals pref-
erence, both between husband and wife's subutilities and between one's own goods 
and leisure. Also let s be an L-vector of distribution factors which affect only the 
decision of the sharing of resources between husband and wife but not affecting the 
preferences and the household budget constraint. The existence of s can greatly 
simplify the process of the identification. 
Assume that each household allocates its resources to attain Pareto Efficiency. 
Given Pareto Efficiency, for any given (wA,WB,y,z,s), where wa，wb are wages 
of husband and wife respectively and y = ？ + 7/5 is the total non-labor income 
of husband and wife, there exists a weighting factor iJ,{wA,WB,y,z,s) which lies 
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between 0 and 1 such that i = A, B, solves the following program: 
— (PI) 
s.t C^ + C^ < WaH^ + WBhB + y 
A feature in the above program is that the vector of distribution factors s only 
appears in the weighting factor fj, but not in the preference and budget constraint. 
This gives rise to the following result, which is also given and proven in Chiappori 
et al. (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (1995): 
Propos i t i on 5.1 Let h\wA,WB,y,z,s) be the reduced form labor supply equation 
for husband and wife (i = A,B) which solves (PI). Then we have the following: 
dhAjdsk — dhB/dsk 
dhA/dsi = dhBjdsi 
for any element k,l of the vector of distribution factor s. 
The proof is given in the aforementioned papers. 
This can provide one test of Pareto Efficiency of the household decision, provided 
that more than one ..distribution factors are available. 
Since we have a caring (or a simpler special case: egotistic) preference for the 
two decision-making adults, as mentioned in Chiappori et al. (2002), by the second 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, any Pareto optimum can be decentral-
ized with appropriate redistribution of resources. Thus the following sharing rule 
interpretation follows. 
Propos i t i o n 5.2 (Chiappori et al. (2002)) Under the assumption of caring pref-、 
erence for the two decision making adults, the program (PI) is equivalent to the 
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existence of a sharing rules (l)j^{wA,WB,y,z,s) and z,s) such that for 
i = A (husband) or B (wife), each solves the following program: 
max U\L\C\z) (P2) 
S.t. & < Wih' + (/)• 
where = y. 
As in Chiappori et al. (2002)，the proof is referred to Chiappori (1992). 
The decision process can be taken as a two-stage process. In the first stage, they 
collectively decide how much non-labor income one can obtain (or equivalently how 
much money one transfers to the other). In the second stage, each person decides 
how much goods and leisure one consumes (and thus the labor supply). 
Under the collective model with caring preference, we can obtain some restric-
, tions on the labor supply and retrieve the sharing rule derivatives. From (P2), 
assuming that we have interior solutions (non-zero labor supply), the labor supply 
functions can be written as follows: 
= h'^{wA,(l)AiwA,WB,y,Z,s),z) (5.1) 
hB(WA,WB,y,z,s) = (5.2) 
where is member i,s Marshallian labor supply function in structural form. In 
the above relation, we can see that other's wage, non-labor incomes and distribu-
tion factors enter the labor supply function only through the sharing rule (p\ This 
property is the key to identification. Let h^. denote dh'/dx. Define Ai = h^^/hf^, 
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Bi = h l j h l , Ci = = h^/hf^, provided that both /i^ and h^ axe non-zero. 
Also to simplify our notation, we take = </> and = ?/ — 0 so that identifying 
(j)、WA,WB,y,z,s) automatically means identifying and The above terms A 
to D can all be estimated from the labor supply equations. Similar to Chiappori et 
al.'s (2002) proposition 3，the following gives the identification results^ 
P r o p o s i t i o n 5.3 For any point such that j • / i f 一 0 for a given I , Then 
(i) if there is only one distribution factor (so that I = 1) and Ci • Di, the 
following are necessary conditions for any pair (h^, h^) which solves (P2) for sharing 
rule (f)： 
[ f 1 \ 一 ！ f Ci \ 
d^ \Ci-DJ 二 ^ VCi-Diy 
d / 1 \ 二 ！ r Bi \ 
. dwA W i - y ~ ^ VC' i- i^ i J 
d / 1 \ 二 f Al \ 
^ [Ci-dJ 二 ^ [Ci-DJ (5.3) 
d f Ci \ = d f B： \ 
dwA \Ci-dJ - \CI-DJ 
• _d_ / Ci \ = / Al \ 
^ \Ci-Di) = ^ VCi -Diy 
d f El \ = d f Al \ 
^ VCi - D J “ ^ V^ i -
and two Slutsky conditions. 
(a) if the above conditions hold, for any given z，the sharing rule is defined up to 
an additive function K{z). The partial derivatives of the sharing rule with respect 
iThe difference is that, we have used the derivatives of one distribution factor as denominator 
of all the ratios A to D, while Chiappori et al. (2002) have used the derivatives of total household 
non-labor income. 
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to WA,WB,y,s are given as follows: 
‘ �= c r b ： 
《 = 為 （5.4) 
% Ci - D, 
Lb C i - A . 
(Hi) If there are more than one distribution factors, necessary and sufficient 
conditions of identification also include: 
k^ hB 
= # fork = 2”" ,L (5.5) 
l^e can call this ratio Gk. The partial derivatives of sharing rule with respect to 
these extra distribution factors are given by 
‘ = = (5.6) 
Proof. The proof is similar to that provided in Chiappori et al. (2002). With 
the labor supply equations(5.1) and (5.2)，where (p^ = y - <^4，we can derive the 
following: 
• • = f • (5.7) 
氏 = f = t (5.8) 
Ci+t (5.9) 
1 - "？1 - - K (5.10) 
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Clearly, 
r D j 拟 杀 — 1 - — — = — 
Therefore, 
From (5.7)，(5.8)，(5.9), all the other four partial derivatives can obtained. 
For the necessary conditions in part (i), (5.3) are due to the Young，s Theorem 
which imposes certain cross derivative restrictions on the sharing rule. The condi-
tions are 
rdf\ 一 色 
dx \dyj dy \dxj 
where x and y are one of the element in 
If there are more than one distribution factors, from the above labor supply equa-
tions (5.1) and (5.2), we have 
K ^ K 
, K — K 
K ^ zK 
K 一 -K 
Thus (5.5) holds. Finally，the partial derivatives of the sharing rule with respect 
to the extra distribution factors either come from replacing Si with Sk in the above 
derivations, or by using (5.5)，we have /i^ = Gkhi^, where Gk can be estimated by 
above equalities. From the first of (5.4)， 
K = Ci-Di 
<t>si Ck - Dk 
= K I K - W 
一 h^/Gkhi - hB/G,hl 
= G , 
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5.2 Parametric Specification 
First we specify a functional form for the labor supply equations of husband and 
wife and tests of unitary and collective models of household decision. Following 
Chiappori et al. (2002), the following functional form is employed. 
hA = mo + mi l o g — ) + 7712 log—s) +7713 log—A) l o g — ) +77242/+ 
nigz + nigS (5.11) 
二 /o + fi log—A) + /2 log(i(;s) + /a log—力 log(wB) + f^y + 
f‘z + f^s 
where m^, fi are parameters to be estimated. Since z and s are vectors, 1115，mg’ fg fe 
are vectors of corresponding dimensions. With this specification, several tests on 
the labor supply model can be performed and sharing rule can be recovered up to 
an additive function of preference factors z. 
First of all, unitary model implies that distribution factors should not affect 
decision, as it only affects distribution of power but not for preferences and bud-
get constraints. This implies nig = f^ = 0, which means the coefficients on all 
distribution factors should be zero. 
For collective model, first, if we have more than one distribution factor, a condi-
tion implied by Pareto Efficiency is given in Proposition 5.1 and also (5.5). In the 
above parametric equations, this condition of proportionality of effects from various 
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distribution factors becomes 
I 毕 ( 5 . 1 2 ) 
- ？ 6^/ hi 
for all k,l = where mgi and /qi are the ？八 element of the the coefficient 
vector me and fe respectively. 
With the above proportionality condition, one distribution factor can represent 
the change in Pareto weight. Without loss of generality, we use the first distribution 
factor for identification^. The sharing rule can be recovered as follows: 
= _ _ • 
SI 爪4/61 一 f^rriQi 
小 _ 爪 6k f6k GkiriQifQi 
朴 m^fek - fArriQk rn^Ui 一 fm^i 
^ m^Ui - hrriQi ( • ) 
• =爪6 1 ( / l +/3l0g Wb) 
WAim^fei - Urnei) 
‘ (j) = /6i(m2 + m3 log wa) 
切B wsimjei - f^mei) 
‘ For the above sharing rule to be valid, the cross derivation conditions (5.3) have 
to be satisfied. Since linear form is imposed for most variables, many of the cross 
derivative conditions are automatically satisfied as both sides become zero. The 
only non-linear component - is for wages. Differentiating the last two conditions in 
(5.13), we have the following condition for equality of cross derivatives: 
^61/3 = feims (5.14) 
2 With the above proportionality condition (5.12) imposed to the restricted model, using any 
of the distribution factors will give the same result because the proportionality constant can be 
cancelled out. 
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Combining (5.12) and (5.14), we can have the following: 
_ m^i _ _ msL , . 
“ f ~ f — … 一 " 7 ~ [o.io) 
h /61 J6L 
With these conditions, if we denote K = ms/mei = /3//61, the restricted form 
of the collective model with caring becomes, 
hA = mo + rui + 7712 l o g — ) + Kruei log—力 log—丑）+ 
L 
rriiy + m'^z + ^  GkrueiSk (5.16) 
k=l 
hB = /o + / i l o g — + / 2 log(^s) + K/ei log(^^A) log—S) + 
L 
/42/ + f5Z + ^Gjt/6lSfc 
k=l 
Notice that each equation shares the same Gk due to (5.12) and the same K due to 
(5.14). 
Finally, the sharing rule can be written as follows: 
‘ 0 = log'u;^ + 7722/61 ^ogWB + Kmeifei \ogWA \ogWB + 1714feiy 
L 
+ Y^ Gitmei/ei^jt] + K[7) (5.17) 
k=i •• 
where V = m^f&i 一 /‘mei. 
Thus the sharing rule can be recovered up to an additive function of preference 
factor z. K{z) cannot be recovered because z appears both in the sharing rule and 
the preference. 
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5.3 Data and Empirical Results 
5.3.1 Sample and Variables 
In this section, the married sample with both husband and wife working and report-
ing positive hours of work and positive labor income are included. As in previous 
analysis, only those with both husband and wife between the age of 25 to 60 in-
clusively are included to reduce the problem of sample selection of out of work for 
studying or retirement. Following Chiappori et al. (2002)，sample selection adjust-
ment are not made in this study^ This criteria leaves us a sample of 1615 households 
for estimation. 
The summary statistics for this subsample are shown in Table 5.1. The mean 
hours of work for both males and females are around 187 hours per month (around 
. 4 3 hours a week), which is a little bit lower than sample of all workers. Besides, 
the mean wage for both males and females (which are around 6.1 and 4.7 yuans 
respectively) are both lower than the overall sample, with the gender wage gap kept 
at around 23%. On average, males get slightly more non-labor income (only 0.15 
yuan at mean), and as shown in Table 3.6a，only 184 households report a positive 
total non-labor income. Husbands are on average 2.14 years older than wives while 
3 As noted in Chiappori et al. (2002), sample selection bias may arise by using only the sample of 
working spouses. However, no sample selection correction is attempted in their paper. They have 
given two reasons. First, it requires the development of collective models with corner solutions. 
(See Blundell et. al. (2001) and Donni (2001) about non-participation.) Second, there is some 
evidence, like Mroz (1987), that sample selectivity is not likely to be a problem for women's labor 
supply. 
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the spousal difference in education is indeed slight. 
In this chapter, dependent variables are male and female hours of work in a 
month. Regressors include natural logarithm of male and female hourly wages and 
their product, total household non-labor income^ together with some preference 
factors and distribution factors. 
The preference factors include one's own age and year of education, self-evaluated 
health status and dummies for presence of parents, pre-school children and school-
age children。• Besides, city dummies and work unit dummies are also entered to 
capture the difference in hours of work due to the norm of different cities and different 
type of units of employment®. 
For distribution factors, one of them can be the difference of non-labor income 
between the spouses. Holding total non-labor income constant, difference in non-
‘ l a b o r income should not have any effect on intra-household allocation unless there 
is a difference in the intra-household bargaining power. Here husband minus wife's 
non-labor income is used. It is expected that the higher this difference, the more 
• 4 Here total non-labpr income only refers to the sum of non-labor income from this couple. 
5 Though collective model is originally designed for two-member households, it can also be 
applied to households with children, such as in Chiappori et al. (2002)，if the couple are the key 
decision makers with the control of resources. Households with other members are also included in 
this study to retain the sample size. We have put the existence of parents as a control variable. We 
have also tried to put number or existence dummy of other people in the equations as a control, and 
it turns out that neither the number nor the dummy of presence of other people in the household is 
significant. Thus these people are in some sense independent of the main couple being investigated. 
6 The work unit dummy can also help us control for some benefits to employees related to these 
units which cannot be well-measured in monetary terms. 
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power should have for husband since the household depends more on him to obtain 
non-labor income. 
Another distribution factor I use is the sex ratio, which is also used in Chiappori 
et al. (2002). In my study, the sex ratio is constructed by using population by sex 
at city level from Population Census in China in 2000. As mentioned before, the 
average difference of age between husband and wife in this subsample is around 2.14 
years. The sex ratio is thus constructed by taking the ratio of the male population 
in that city in a 5-yeax range between 2 years older and 2 years younger than the 
husband of the family to the corresponding female population of age two years 
lower: Other sex ratios are also attempted but results for the sex ratio constructed 
above gives the most satisfactory results^. The sex ratio is treated as a distribution 
factor since it changes the threat point of bargaining within a household. The more 
‘ t h e population of a specific sex, the more difficult one in that sex to get remarried 
if divorced, and thus the present marriage is more important to them. Hence their 
threat point is lower and their bargaining power is weaker. So, it is expected that 
the higher the sex ratio, the higher the working hours for males and the lower the 
working hours for females. Some potential problems of using the sex ratio as a 
7 For example, if the husband of a household is 30 years of age, then the sex ratio is the ratio 
of male population in that city between the age of 28 and 32 to female population in that city of 
age 26 to 30 . 
"These include using populations in 1-year or 3-year range instead of five. It is also considered to 
use female population of the same age rather than 2 years younger. Besides, ratios using population 
of the corresponding husband's age and wife's age are also attempted instead of only the husband's 
one. 
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distribution factor are discussed in Chiappori et al. (2002)9. In our data, the mean 
sex ratio is 1.05, which means there are slightly more males than females on average 
between the two groups in comparison. 
Other possible distribution factors include difference in age and education be-
tween husband and wife. As discussed in Browning et al. (1994)，when their own 
age and education enter their own demand equations (or in this case leisure or labor 
supply), the difference in age and education can be taken as distribution factors^®. 
In the two labor supply equations, some regressors are suspected to be endoge-
nous. As in the previous section, wages and non-labor incomes are suspected to 
be endogenous. In Chiappori et al. (2002)，number of children in pre-school ages 
and school ages are also treated as endogenous. However, in previous chapter, we 
cannot reject that children variables are exogenous, and thus in this section children 
. a r e taken as exogenous^. Instrumental variable method is used to deal with the 
9 There may be two alternative explanations of the influence of sex ratio to hours of work are 
‘ provided in Chiappori et. al. (2002). One is a lower population of a particular sex implies there is 
a lower supply of workers in that sex, which may in turn requiring them to work more to satisfy 
the demand. This runs in an opposite direction to the household bargaining argument. Another 
argument is concerning migration. If one city demands more workers in a particular sex, it may 
attract more workers elsewhere to migrate there and in turns raise the population of that sex 
relative to the other and at the same time people of that sex have to work more. This effect 
also affects unmarried individuals, and thus we can distinguish this effect by looking at unmarried 
equations. 
⑴ However, one concern is that difference in age and education can be endogenous due to assor-
tative mating. (See Becker (1991), especially Chapter 4.) 
11 Mroz (1987) also finds that children variables are not endogenous in their sample. 
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endogenous regressors. The excluded instruments include second and third order 
polynomials of age and year of education of both husband and wife, cross terms 
of age and education of both husband and wife, the respondent's language ability, 
dummies of education level of parents (beyond lower secondary), and whether the 
respondent is a member of Communist party or a member of ethnic minority. 
The estimation method used in this section is the full information Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM). The advantage of this method is that it not only takes 
into account the covariance between the error terms of the estimated equations 
and allow for instrumental variable estimations, but it also takes into account the 
heteroscadasticity of unknown form, and therefore it can provide a set of more 
asymptotically efficient estimators of model parameters than other methods like 
3SLS or FIML. 
5.3.2 Results 
First an unrestricted model (5.11) is estimated. The results are shown in Table 5.2. 
In our estimation, difference in non-labor income, difference in years of education 
and the sex ratio turn out to be three distribution factors that give the desirable 
feature of opposite signs in male and female hours of work equations as well as 
having relatively significant coefficients. 
As in previous chapter, the estimated equations are not robust. Many key vari-
ables are not significant at conventional level. The Hensen overidentifying restriction 
test, as shown in Table 5.3, does not reject the null hypothesis of valid overiden-
tifying instruments. The test statistics is 41.93 with 38 degrees of freedom, with 
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p-value 0.30. 
Though not very robust, some trends can be discovered. The wage effects are 
generally negative, for both husband and wife, and the only significant wage coef-
ficient is male's wage on his own labor supply. This is contrary to the results in 
Chiappori et al. (2002) and other conventional estimates in which female's labor 
supply is not yet backward bending. Besides, for non-labor income variables, the 
estimates are also not very robust for both total non-labor income and difference in 
non-labor income. One possible reason is that, as mentioned before, very few people 
report positive non-labor income in the survey. Since the identification depends on 
total non-labor income, together with other distribution factors including difference 
in non-labor income, the identified sharing rule may lack precision. 
For the three retained distribution factors, only difference in education is signif-
icant at 5% in female's labor supply. The signs for these distribution factors are as 
expected. Husbands work less when they have higher non-labor income and higher 
education relative to wives. Husbands work more if they face a larger sex ratio. 
A similar hours of work equation is also estimated for unmarried sample for 
comparison. The results are shown in the Appendix in Table A.l. Since most 
of our distribution factors come from the difference in variables between husbands 
and wives, which are not available for unmarried sample, the only thing we can 
compare is the sex ratio. It is found that the coefficients of sex ratio are negative 
and insignificant in both male and female unmarried equations. This gives some 
evidence that the effect found in the household labor supply model is more likely 
due to intra-household distribution effect than other factors related to the labor 
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market, since the same effect cannot be found in the unmarried sample. 
Some tests concerning unitary and collective models are made. The results are 
shown on Table 5.3. First, for unitary model, a test is made on significance of all 
distribution factors. Wald test can reject the null hypothesis of no effect for all the 
distribution factors at 10% level, with Chi-square statistic of 11.265 with 5 degrees 
of freedom. Therefore, distribution factors do have some effect on intra-household 
allocation and the result casts some doubts on unitary models. 
Next, some tests on the collective model are performed. First, for Pareto Ef-
ficiency as in equation (5.12), all the effect of distribution fax^ tors should be pro-
portional. Newey West test, which is based on the difference in functional values 
of restricted and unrestricted model, following Chi-squaxed distribution with degree 
of freedom equal to number of restrictions, is usecP. It is found that the Pareto 
efficiency condition is not rejected, with test statistic of 1.932 with 2 degrees of 
freedom. 
Finally, in order to obtain a valid sharing rule, an extra cross derivative condition 
(5.14) has to be satisfied. Therefore, condition (5.15)，which combines (5.12) and 
(5.14)，is taken as a test of validity of collective model with caring preference. As 
shown in Table 5.3, the Newey West test cannot reject these restrictions, thus it 
gives some support to the collective model. 
i2ln principle, it is suggested, for example in Hayashi (2000, p. 222), that same weight matrix 
should be used for restricted and unrestricted model to ensure that the test statistic is positive. 
However, even without using the same weight matrix, the statistic is also asymptotically Chi-square 
distributed. Owing to technical constraint, their respective optimal weight matrices are used in 
estimating restricted and unrestricted model to obtain the Newey West test statistics in this study. 
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In Table 5.4，we have estimated the restricted model (5.16), with condition (5.15) 
imposed. The coefficients shown are the coefficient before each variable. Some of 
them are retrieved from the estimated K and Gk. The estimated coefficients are a 
little more precise than the unrestricted model, with more coefficients of distribution 
factors become significant at the 5% or 10% level. Though coefficients of difference 
in non-labor income are not significant at 10% level, their t-ratio is already higher 
than 1，which is close to be significant and likely to have some effects. 
Table 5.5a shows the retrieved sharing rule for the husband. Since non-labor 
variables entered into the equations are all divided by 1000，the sharing rule param-
eters are also shown in per thousand yuans. Table 5.5b shows the marginal effect 
of a change in various factors on husband's share of non-labor income in yuan. The 
wage effect on the sharing rule is insignificant. The husband's wage has a negative 
,e f fect on the amount he can get from total non-labor income, implying that he will 
free up more resources for the spouse when he earns more. When there is a one unit 
increase in the husband's wage, husbands can get 23.43 yuan less from the total non-
labor income per month^^. However, from our estimate, when there is an increase 
in wage rate for wives, husbands can still get less from the total non-labor income, 
though the amount is relatively small (only 6.71 yuan a month). This may reflect a 
rise of bargaining power of wife as she can earn more. For non-labor income, with 
one yuan increase in non-labor income, husbands can get 0.46 yuan, which is close 
to one half. This parameter is also significant at the 10% level. If there is no change 
in non-labor income, but a change of who earn half a yuan from the wife to the 
13 This has already included the effect of cross wage term. 
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husband, the husband can get an extra of 0.7 yuans. If husbands can earn one more 
yuan in non-labor income while wives earn the same amount of non-labor income, 
husbands can get 1.164 yuans more from the total non-labor income, with 0.164 
extra on top of his own increase in non-labor income, reflecting a rise in bargaining 
power from men. For those husbands who have one year of education higher than 
wives, the husbands can get 16.2 yuans more of the non-labor income a month. This 
effect is small, but statistically significant. Finally, the sex ratio also have a small 
but nearly significant effect. One percent higher sex ratio will induce a 0.632 yuan 
reduction in total non-labor income husbands can obtain. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a household labor supply model is estimated and a sharing rule 
is retrieved according to the collective framework. We can reject that distribution 
^ factors have no effect on time allocation decisions. Besides, we basically cannot reject 
restrictions imposed by the collective model. Thus unitary model is not supported 
while collective model can gain some credence. A sharing rule is then retrieved 
from the parameters of the labor supply equations. It is found that bargaining 
power plays some role in the household allocation, as spousal difference in non-labor 
income, education and the sex ratio affects hours of work and share of income. This 
can also be reflected by smaller non-labor income obtained by male when female 
wage increases. 
In this chapter, the simple labor-leisure dichotomy is employed. However, if we 
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slightly modify our assumption on leisure to distinguish private leisure and public 
(spousal) leisure, we can still identify them using the information from the consump-




Identification of Independent and 
Spousal Leisure 
In this chapter, following Fong and Zhang (2001)，I divide leisure time of each in-
‘ d i v i dua l as public leisure and private leisure for urban Chinese households. Private 
leisure is the leisure time spent on one's own or with other people other than the 
spouse, while public leisure, or spousal leisure, is the time spent with the spouse. As 
mentioned by Fong and Zhang (2001), the knowledge of spousal leisure is important 
because spousal leisure is highly related to the stability of marriage and the satis-
faction derived from the marriage. The contribution of Fong and Zhang (2001) is 
that from the derivatives of the couple's labor supply functions and the consumption 
functions of an assignable good, private and spousal leisure can be identified up to 
an additive function of the preference factors. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first, a theoretical model following Fong 
and Zhang (2001) is presented. Then, a parametric model is presented and the 
66 
coefficients of private and spousal leisure are derived as a function of parameters in 
the hours of work and assignable good consumption equations. Finally, details of 
the estimation process and the results of estimation are presented. 
6.1 Theoretical Model 
6.1.1 Model 
The model is this chapter is slightly different from that used in the previous chapter. 
Again, we assume that we have two decision makers, husband and wife. Let hA and 
h^ be hours of work of the husband and wife respectively. However, we further 
divide the leisure time of each individual into private leisure and spousal leisure. 
Let L^ and L^ be the husband and wife's private leisure respectively and i R be the 
common amount of time for spousal leisure. The time allocation must satisfy the 
identity /i^  + + = T for i = A, B, where T is the total time endowment. 
To facilitate identification, there are also some modifications on the goods con-
sumption side. In the previous chapter, aggregate consumption of a person is used. 
Here, we allow consumptions of a variety of goods. Let q^ and q^ be the con-
sumption vectors of private goods of husband and wife respectively and Q be the 
consumption vector of public goods. For identification, consumption of one of the 
private goods for each of the couple must be observable. We call such a good an 
assignable good. We denote the husband and wife's consumption of this assignable 
good as c二 and cf respectively. 
For the preference, first, we assume that each of the husband and wife has a caring 
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In this section, the sample is basically the same as in the previous chapter. The 
only difference is that some of these households do not report clothing expenditure 
and so the sample size is reduced to 1610. The summary statistics of this subsample 
are shown in Table 6.1. On average, wives consume more on clothing than husbands. 
The monthly expenditure is about 88 yuans for females and 65 yuans for males in 
a monthio. 
Dependent variables are husband and wife's monthly hours of work and logarithm 
of the clothing expenditure. Following Browning et al. (1994), we take inverse hy-
perbolic sine as an approximation to natural logarithm. The advantage, as stated 
in Browning et al. (1994), is that it is also defined on zero or even negative values, 
while it can function similar to, or even better than natural logarithm^^ Of these 
1610 households with both husband and wife reporting their clothing expenditures, 
1557 husbands and 1579 wives report positive clothing expenditure while others 
reporting zero. Since only less than 3.3% of people reporting zero consumption, 
and in some previous work, like Browning et al. (1994), researchers do not par-
ticularly remove observations with zero consumption, those observations with zero 
consumption are retained. The annual nature of the data has significantly reduced 
the problem of "infrequency of purchase" as there are only a very small portion of 
households reporting zero consumption on clothing. 
For regressors, as shown in the previous section, they are mainly of three types. 
i()The monthly expenditure is obtained by the reported annual expenditure divided by 12. 
11 Browning et. al. (1994) state, "Thus we can use this transformation (inverse hyperbolic sine) 
to remove the 'left skewness' that take logs often induces"(p. 1082. note 15). 
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The first type is the key structural variables which include logarithm of husband's 
and wife's hourly wage and total non-labor income of husband and wife. The other 
two types include preference factors and distribution factors. 
The preference factors are basically similar to those used in the previous chapter. 
One's own age, years of education and self-evaluated health status are entered into 
the equation of one's own hours of work and consumption. Besides, some household 
factors including number of parents, pre-school and school age children are also 
entered into the equations. City dummies are also entered, as before, as a control 
of slightly different norms and relative prices in different cities. The new preference 
factors used in this section include the occupation dummies and logarithm^^ of total 
support from parents of both husband and wife in their expenditure at marriage. 
Occupation is related to different dress code requirements which may affect the 
expenditure on clothing. Total parental support on marriage expenditure is used 
because the difference of marriage expenditure paid by husband and wife's parents 
is used here as one of the distribution factors, which will be discussed below. 
For distribution factors, those used in the previous chapter are also used here. 
They are difference in non-labor income (male minus female), difference in years of 
education (male minus female) and the sex ratio. The definition of the sex ratio is 
the same as in the Chapter 5. The newly used distribution factors include difference 
‘ in age (male minus female) and difference in marriage expenditure paid by parents 
(male minus female). For the latter, if parents provide a larger amount of funds for 
Here again, we use inverse hyperbolic sine as an approximation to natural logarithm for this 
variables in order to retain those reported zero parental support. 
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one's marriage, it reflects that one has a stronger family, which can give a better 
support if divorced, leading to a stronger bargaining power within the marriage. 
Furthermore, a portion of this parental support may be in the form of transfer of 
asset from parents to child which may not be able to generate income (for example, 
gold and jewelry) but may be used to support themselves when divorced. Thus 
difference in expenditure in marriage paid by parents can be taken as one potential 
distribution factor. This last distribution factor turns out to be not very appropriate 
in collective household labor supply framework in the previous chapter, but, as we 
will see, it performs relatively better in this model, and therefore it is included. 
As before, certain variables axe taken as endogenous. Wage rates variables and 
non-labor income variables are again treated as endogenous and instrumental vari-
ables methods are used. The excluded instruments are the same as in last chapter, 
which include second and third order polynomials of age and years of education of 
- husband and wife, cross terms of age and years of education for husband and wife, 
the respondent's language fluency, dummy variables of education of parents of the 
couple (whether they study beyond junior secondary school level), and whether the 
respondent is a member qf communist party or a member of ethnic minority. 
Finally, the estimation method used in this chapter is again the full information 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which takes into account heteroscadastic-
ity of unknown form and provides a set of asymptotically efficient estimators. 
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6.3.2 Results 
Model Estimation and Tests 
Before estimating the model (6.10)，a model with cross wage terms log(it;^) log(u;s) 
is estimated. A Wald test on the significance of these terms is made. The statistic 
is 2.495 with 4 degrees of freedoms. Its p-value is as high as 0.646，which means it 
is likely that the related coefficients are zero. Thus we do not include these terms 
in our estimation. The unrestricted model (6.10) is then estimated and the result 
is shown in Table 6.2. The Hensen over-identifying restriction test, as shown in 
the first column of the table 6.3, does not reject the null hypothesis of validity of 
instruments and over-identifying restrictions, with test statistic of 79.70 with 76 
degrees of freedom. The p-value is 0.3634. 
. As shown in the estimation results, the wage effect on hours of work are in general 
negative and significant, similar to what we have found in the previous chapter, with 
the own wage having a stronger effect. For consumption on clothing, both husband 
and wife's wages have a positive effect on clothing expenditure, with a larger effect 
from female's wage. For total non-labor income, it has a significant effect to women's 
hours of work and men's clothing expenditure. The effect of total non-labor income 
to clothing are both positive for husbands and wives, which confirms that clothing 
is not an inferior good. 
For distribution factors, their effects are not very strong and precise in oiir es-
timates. It is expected that the signs on clothing equations are more important as 
ratios of the quasi-sharing rule X ^ and X ^ are directly retrieved from assignable 
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consumption expenditure, while hours of work are related to both private leisure and 
spousal leisure. The effects of distribution factors on husband's clothing expenditure 
are generally larger than those of wife's. All signs on distribution factors agree with 
expectation except for difference in non-labor income on husband's clothing expen-
diture, which has a negative but insignificant effect when his non-labor income is 
higher relative to his wife. Husbands with more education, higher age and higher 
parental expenditure on marriage generally consume more on clothing and their 
wives consume less, implying a stronger bargaining power for husbands. A higher 
sex ratio, on the contrary, gives husbands less consumption and more for their wives 
because husbands become more difficult to remarry after divorce as his choices of 
potential wife is fewer. 
In Table A.2 in Appendix, hours of work and clothing equation with similar spec-
ification is estimated for comparison. The sex ratio is entered into these equations 
to see if the same effect is also present for unmarried sample. It is found that the 
sex ratio has a negative effect on all four equations and they are all insignificant. 
This implies that the sex ratio effect found in this household model is more likely 
due to the intra-household distribution effect than other social-economic factors. 
For preference factors, more noticeable is the age factor. It is clear that older 
husbands and wives consume less on clothing. As it is a single cross sectional 
data, such an effect may be due to preference change due to age, or it may reflect 
preference difference between birth cohort. Another preference factor worth noticing 
is the logarithm of total parental support to the marriage. They are positive in both 
clothing consumption equations, and it is significant for husband's equation while 
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it is near to significant for females. This implies that, given wage and income of 
the couple, family background and asset holdings play a role towards consumption 
decision. 
Some tests concerning unitary and collective models are performed. Results are 
shown in Table 6.3. One test is on the significance of all distributional factors. 
Unitary model implies that distribution factors should have no effect on household 
allocation, thus it should not affect hours of work and assignable good consump-
tion decisions. The Wald test shows that the null hypothesis of zero effect from 
distribution factors is highly rejected with p-value below 0.01. It means that intra-
household bargaining does matter in the household allocation process^ .^ For the 
collective model, Newey West test on Pareto efficiency (that is condition 6.11) can-
not reject the proportionality conditions. Since there are no cross terms in this 
specification, no further restrictions on the parameters are needed. Then we go on 
to estimate the model restricted by (6.11). 
Table 6.4 shows the estimated model of (6.12)i4. Wages are as robust as before, 
but total non-labor income gets a little bit weaker. The distribution factors are 
quite significant for male's clothing equation, but still none of them is significant 
in female's equation, though the signs are all opposite to that of males. Indeed, 
the newly added factor of difference in parental support on marriage expenditure is 
It can be argued that these distributional factors are not well chosen. For example, difference 
in education and age may affect preference of the household or specialization decision within a 
household. Besides, assortative mating may make these variables endogenous (see Becker 1991). 
cofficients of the distribution factors are retrieved from the estimated e^i multiplied by 
the estimated coefficient for the first distribution factor (aei, tei.^^ei or /ei). 
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weaker than the other factors, with t-ratio of just around one. 
One may argue that existence of children may make this decomposition of private 
and spousal leisure a little vague. I have also tried to re-estimate this restricted 
model by a subsample without pre-school or school age children. The coefficient 
estimates of some key variables are shown in Table 6.5. The sample size is reduced 
to 584. It is found that the results are basically similar to those we found in the larger 
sample with children, especially for distribution factors for clothing equations. The 
difference in non-labor income and difference in parental expenditure on marriage 
are not too strong in this subsample without children. As the larger sample seems 
more robust in estimation, we decide to use the larger sample (with children) to 
derive the parameters in individual and spousal leisure. 
. Identification of private and spousal leisure 
The identification results are shown in Table 6.6a and some marginal effects are 
shown in Table 6.6b. The upper half of Table 6.6a is the identified individual 
private leisure function parameters. Only the own wage effect on women's private ‘ 
leisure is significant at the 5% level. The effect from male's wage change is larger 
than the effect of female's wage change to individual private leisure for both of them. 
Besides, own wage effect is larger than the cross wage effect. In a month, an increase 
in hourly wage of husband by one yuan induces himself to increase leisure by 12.27 
hours, while it induces his wife to increase her leisure by 8.67 hours. An increase in 
hourly wage for wife induces her own private leisure to increase by 7.30 hours and 
it induces only 2.93 hours increase in private leisure for husband for a month. An 
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increase in total non-labor income induces a greater increase in private leisure for 
wife than for husband (6.1 versus 2.5 hours a month per hundred yuan increases), 
while increase in husband's non-labor income by a hundred yuans, holding wife's 
constant, husband can enjoy 6.6 hours more leisure a month while wife can enjoy 
only 0.2 more hours. On the other hand, an increase in wife's non-labor income by 
a hundred yuans, there is an increase of her own non-labor income of 12 hours while 
husband reduces his private leisure. From this result, husband's income tends to 
have a spillover effect to his wife, reflecting caring or altruism, while wife's income 
reflect an increase of bargaining power for wives. Moreover, a higher education, 
higher age and higher amount of parental support at marriage for husband induce a 
larger amount of private leisure for husband and lower private leisure for wife, while 
an increase in sex ratio reduces husband's private leisure and increases the wife's, 
though the effect is still quite small in terms of number of hours in a month. 
Finally, the spousal leisure is identified and the results are shown in the lower part 
of Table 6.6a. The estimates are not precise as none of the estimated parameters 
is statistically significant at a conventional level. It is surprising to see that the 
estimated effect of wage and non-labor income to spousal leisure are all negative. 
With the previous results, it means that when the wage rate for oneself or spouse 
increases, people tend to work less, enjoy more private leisure, but at the same time 
reduces the time with their spouse. An increase in one yuan in hourly wage for 
husband reduces spousal leisure by 6.7 hours and the same increase for wife's wage 
reduces spousal leisure for 3.4 hours. An increase in male's non-labor income by 100 
yuan, holding the wife's non-labor income constant, reduces spousal leisure by 0.2 
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hours a month while the same increase of female's non-labor income reduces spousal 
leisure by 3.7 hours a month. For other distribution factors, they are indeed quite 
far from significantly different from zero. One possible reason is that it reflects a 
balance of power between the couple, and therefore the effect of distribution factors 
on one's bargaining power will cancel out each other in the spousal leisure. As 
the signs of distribution factors on spousal leisure are the same as those to men's 
bargaining power, the change of spousal leisure tends to be more responsive to 
husband's bargaining power. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a model following Fong and Zhang (2001) is used to investigate the 
change in individual and spousal leisure. Four simultaneous equations on house-
hold decisions, two hours of work equations and two consumption of clothing equa-
tions are estimated. Based on the theoretical model, derivatives of independent and 
spousal leisure are retrieved using the estimated parameters of the four equations. 
As in the previous chapters, distribution factors basically do matter for intra-
household allocations and thus unitary model basically fails. Besides, the collective 
model generally cannot be rejected by our data with this specification. 
Five distribution factors are used in this model including spousal difference in 
non-labor income, difference in years of education, difference in age, difference in 
parental support on marriage expenditure and the sex ratio. Difference in parental 
support is a relatively new one, though the results in our estimation is not particu-
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larly promising. The transfer of parents to the spouse, especially assets, can be an 
important potential factor which affect the bargaining power within a household (for 
example, Zhang and Chan, 1999). We cannot measure this exactly this time, but 
for further research, this piece of information can be useful to improve our results. 
Private and spousal leisure functions are retrieved in the study. Interestingly, 
when wage rates increase, only private leisure increases, while both spousal leisure 
and hours of work decrease. Besides, our estimation of private and spousal leisure are 
not too robust. One possible reason is that the identification depends quite heavily 
on total non-labor income, but its effect is not strong in our estimation. Besides, 
female expenditure on clothing are not responsive to the factors entered into the 
equation, which may require more investigations to understand how factors change 
the female clothing expenditure. Third, clothing may not be a good assignable good 
if there exist some externalities of clothing consumption between the couple, and its 
. consumption involves some public component in nature. 
In conclusion, due to time and data availability constraint, it is just a preliminary 




In this thesis, intra-household allocation in urban China is analyzed. Three main 
tasks are performed. First, preliminary analysis on individual wage and labor supply 
are made. Second, a household labor supply model is estimated following Chiap-
" pori et al. (2002). Under the assumptions of the collective framework, a sharing 
mle of non-labor income can be retrieved up to an additive function of preference 
factors. Third, with the formulation of collective household model by Fong and 
Zhang (2001), identifications of spousal and individual private leisure, also up to an . 
additive function of preference factors, are performed. 
For the first task, in the wage equation, the estimated rate of return to education 
is around 10%, with the return for females slightly higher than that of males. This 
is similar to recent studies of China like Kung (2002). This shows that the more _ 
market-oriented Chinese economy has substantial reward to education in terms of 
wage and salary. For labor supply, the estimated equations are less robust. The 
estimated effect of wage on hours of work are both negative for males and females 
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while the estimated effect of own non-labor income is in general negative, but that of 
spouse's income positive. Though not strong enough to be statistically significant, 
the differential effect of different people's income can cast a doubt on the income 
pooling hypothesis under the unitary framework. 
For the second task, a model of joint labor supply is estimated. Distribution 
factors have a statistically significant effect on labor supply, implying that intra-
household bargaining may play some roles in the allocation process and unitary 
models are not too accurate. Besides, restrictions imposed by the collective model 
cannot be rejected by the data. Spousal difference in education, spousal difference in 
non-labor income and the sex ratio turn out to have some effect on the distribution 
of non-labor income within the family. 
Finally, a model of joint labor supply and assignable good consumption is esti-
mated. Again, the distribution factors have statistically significant effect on hours of 
. work and assignable consumption, and we cannot reject the restrictions imposed by 
the collective model As well as those mentioned above, spousal difference in age and 
spousal difference in parental support in their marriage are also found to play some 
roles in the intra-househpld allocation. The identified individual and spousal leisure 
are not robust, but interestingly, we find that when wage and non-labor income in-
crease, both husband and wife tend to increase individual leisure, decrease spousal 
leisure and at the same time reduce work. It is interesting why spousal leisure seems 
to be inferior, though our estimated effect is not statistically significant. 
For future research, two main directions are suggested. First, development of 
models concerning non-participation and corner solutions should be helpful in deal-
94 
ing with real life problem in sample selection bias in participation and zero consump-
tion. Second, extension of collective models to the expenditure and time spent on 
children will be useful in understanding the welfare of children. This can also enable 
us to have a more accurate identification of leisure to intergenerational leisure as 
well as spousal and individual leisure obtained in this thesis, giving a more thorough 
understanding of intra-household allocation. 
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Table 3.1 Distribution of whole survey sample 
City Non-twins Twins Total 
observations observations observations 
^engdu 223 "358 581 “ 
^ n g q i n g 289 m 593 
Haerbin 458 ^ —801 
H^ei "200 478 678 
"^han IsOl |l529 |2030 
T ^ l |1671 |3Q12 |4683 “ 
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Table 3.2 Definitions of some key variables 
Variable Definition 
Hours of work Actual hours of work in a month (a weekly measure x 4.3). 
Wage rate •“ Wage rate obtained by dividing the total labor income (i.e. monthly 
wage income plus business income plus benefit paid by the 
employment unit) by the total hours of work. 
Log (wage) Natural logarithm of wage rate 
Non-labor income Sum of rental income, interest and dividend income, retirement 
payment, parental transfer and other income. 
Spouse's total income It is the spouse's total labor and non-labor income. If the person is 
not married, it is zero. 
Age Own age, calculated by year of birth reported. 
Years of education Year of education based on the level of education one attained. The 
conversion rule is as follows: 6 years for primary or below; 9 years 
for junior secondary; 12 years for higher secondary and vocational 
schools; 14 years for non-degree tertiary education; 16 years for 
university degree and 18 years for postgraduate studies. 
Experience (potential) Age minus years of education minus 6. 
Actual work experience The reported years of foil time working since 16 years old. 
Married One for those who are currently married. 
Divorced One for those who has been divorced or widowed. (The remaining 
group is single.) 
Pre-school children Number of children in the household below 6. 
• School age children Number of children in the household at school age (i.e. 7-17) (who 
are not working) 
Children under 18 Number of children in the household below 17 (who are not 
‘ working). It is the sum of the above two items. 
Health Status Self-reported rating of health, from 1 to 5. The larger the poorer. 
Communist One if the respondent is a member of the Communist party. 
Minority One if the respondent is of ethnic minority (not belongs to Han). 
Chengdu, Chongqing City dummies. This survey is done in these five cities. Wuhan is 
Haerbin, Hefei, Wuhan usually the omitted dummy. 
Father's education One if father of the person has an education level higher than junior 
dummy secondary school. 
Mother's education One if mother of the person has an education level higher than 
dummy junior secondary school. 
Employment unit Including state units, collective units, local (companies financed by 
dummies local residents), private business and sole proprietor firms. The 
omitted group is those companies which are joint venture with 
foreign companies or a foreign owned company. 
Foreign language A self-evaluation on the foreign language level of one's own. There 
are four areas: listening, reading, writing and speaking. Ratings are 
1 to 4 from "don't know" to "very good". This variable is 
constructed by adding up the rating in 4 areas. Therefore the 
number ranges from 4 to 16. The larger the number, the better one's 
I foreign language ability. No particular language is specified. 
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‘ Putonghua (Chinese Self-evaluation of level of Putonghua (Mandarin). The higher the 
language) number, the better the person's language ability. It ranges from 1 to 
1 
Sex Ratio - It is constructed by taking the ratio of the male population in that 
city in the range between 2 years older and 2 years younger than the 
husband of the family to the corresponding female population, but 2 
years younger than the husband. 
Clothing expenditure Monthly clothing expenditure based on the reported expenditure for 
the previous year and divided by 12 for a monthly measure. 
Parental expenditure at The amount of money (or money value of the gift) paid by parents 
marriage |of the person when the person is married to the present spouse. 
Some minor variables are not explained if it is clear from their own names. 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for Male samples 
Male M Respondents Married Unmarried 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Variables . (St. deviation) (St. deviation) (St. deviation) (St. deviation) 
192.485 192.475 192.787 190.182 
Hours of work (52.115) (51.965) (53.009) (44.699) 
6.378 6.242 6!481 5.590 
Wage (7.144) (7.860) (7.431) (4.285) 
1.616 L592 r ^ 1.540 
Log (wage) (0.645) (0.639) (0.653) (0.574) 
29.806 33.782 28^2^ 41.558 
Own non-labor income (152.394) (163.920) (145.633) (196.379) 
648.952 510.616 733.673 0~ 
Spouse's total income (863.840) (900.099) (884.204) ^ 
11.996 11.735 11.934 12.471 
Years of education (2.574) (2.569) (2.630) (2.046) 
40.309 39.012 41.669 29.928 
Age (8.696) (9.274) . (8.060) (5.935) 
0.884 0.789 i F 
Married (dummy) (0.320) (0.408) (0) • (0) 
0.012 0.022 0 O T ^ 
Divorced (dummy) (0.109) (0.146) (0) (0.306) 
0 4 2 0144 O T ^ OOOJ" 
Pre-school children (0.351) (0.353) (0.369) (0.054) 
0.377 0.318 0.423 0.029 
School age children (0.500) (0.481) (0.511) (0.168) 
2.320 2.269 1351 2.084 
“ H e a l t h status (0.753) (0.769) (0.744) (0.778) 
02^ O ^ 0 1 ^ 
Communist (0.420) (0.436) (0.427) (0.349) 
0^13 O ^ 0.014 0.009 
Minority (0.113) (0.107) (0.116) (0.093) 
0.137 0.131 0 l41 0.101 
Chengdu ： (0.343) (0.338) (0.348) (0.302) 
0.134 0.105 0.142 0.075 
Chongqing (0.341) (0.306) (0.349) (0.264) 
0.167 0.133 0.180 0.066 
Haerbin ； (0.373) (0.340) (0.384) (0.249) 
0.167 0.171 0.159 0.225 
Hefei (0.373) (0.377) (0.366) (0.418) 
0.396 0.460 0.378 0.532 
Wuhan (0.489) (0.499) (0.485) (0.500) 
一 0.659 0.648 0.664 0.618 
Employment unit = state unit (0.474) (0.478) (0.472) (0.486) 
Employment unit = collective 0.084 0.083 0.086 0.069 
unit (0.277) (0.276) (0.280) (0.254) 
Employment unit = private 0.077 0.080 0.071 0.121 
business (0.267) (0.272) (0.257) (0.327) 
Employment unit= sole 0.094 0.099 0.098 0.064 
proprietor firms (0.292) (0.299) (0.298) (0.244) 
0W\ o n 0.520 
Father's education dummy (0.454) (0.465) (0.439) (0.500) 
oTTT? OT52 0.367 





Foreign Language (2.451) 
Actual years of work 18.642 
experience [ (9.780) 
22.313 21.277 21735 U A ^ 
Potential experience (9.464) (10.075) (8.836) (6.647) 
Total observations 2989 1643 2643 346 
Note: for some less important variables, there may be fewer observations than the stated number at 
the bottom due to missing values. 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics for Female samples 
Female M Respondents Married Unmarried 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Variables (St. deviation) (St. deviation) (St. deviation) (St. deviation) 
191.851 190.966 191.262 198.881 
Hours of work (52.531) (52.858) (52.374) (54.032) 
4.945 5.077 4.968 4.668 
Wage (4.613) (4.612) (4.704) (3.344) 
1.363 L m 
Log (wage) (0.662) (0.660) (0.663) (0.651) 
36.282 46.364 J H l S THJI 
Own non-labor income (190.461) (214.207) (179.663) • (288.020) 
1033.327 953.210 1119.907 0 
Spouse's total income (1551.244) (936.696) (1584.636) 
11.936 12.097 n J U 1I207 
Years of education (2.353) (2.320) (2.347) (2.425) 
38.462 39.048 38.743 35.107 
Age (7.596) (7.801) (7.395) (9.049) 
0.923 0.876 T 0 
Married (dummy) (0.267) (0.330) (0) • (0) 
0.040 0.064 0 OST? 
Divorced (dummy) (0.196) (0.245) (0) (0.501) 
0.155 0.125 0.167 O O l I 
Pre-school children (0.363) (0.331) (0.374) (0.132) 
0.442 0.433 0.462 0 2 0 1 
School age children (0.515) (0.512) (0.517) (0.421) 
2.412 2.463 2.416 I W 
. . H e a l t h status (0.721) (0.725) (0.721) (0.720) 
0.232 0.217 0.236 0.183 
Communist (0.422) (0.412) (0.425) (0.388) 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 
Minority (0.118) (0.117) (0.119) (0.108) 
0.151 0.166 0.150 0.160 
Chengdu , (0.358) (0.372) (0.357) (0.367) 
0.154 0.171 0.151 0.189 
Chongqing (0.361) (0.377) (0.358) (0.393) 
0.203 0.217 0.198 0.266 
Haerbin ； (0.402) (0.412) (0.398) (0.443) 
0.144 0.139 0.146 0.118 
Hefei (0.351) (0.346) (0.353) (0.324) 
0.348 0.307 0.355 0.266 
Wuhan (0.476) (0.461) (0.479) (0.443) 
0.604 0.619 0.610 0.533 
Employment unit = state unit (0.489) (0.486) (0.488) (0.500) 
Employment unit = collective 0.123 0.126 0.127 0.071 
unit (0.328) (0.332) (0.333) (0.258) 
Employment unit = private 0.078 0.073 0.069 0.178 
business (0.268) (0.261) (0.254) (0.383) 
Employment unit= sole 0.103 0.086 0.104 0.089 
proprietor firms (0.304) (0.280) (0.305) (0.285) 
0.308 0.334 0.302 0.373 
Father's education dummy (0.462) (0.472) (0.459) (0.485) 
0.207 0.234 0.202 0.266 
Mother's education dummy (0.405)| (0.423)| (0.402)| (0.443) 
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3.2911 
Putonghua ； (1.094) 
6.428 
Foreign Language (2.408) 
‘ 18.584 
Actual years of work experience (8.411) 
20.526 20.952 20.830 16!899 
Potential experience (8.263) (8.585) (8.019) (10.102) 
Total observations 21861 1361 2017 
Note: for some less important variables, there may be fewer observations than the stated number at 
the bottom due to missing values. 
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Table 3.5 Participation and Employment Situation for various samples 
Male M Respondents Married Unmarried 
All individuals' 3939 2174 3 4 ^ ^ f f 
； ^ 3U6 44^ 
In Labor Force! (90.3%) (91.5%) (90.0%) (92.2%) 
Complete information on 2992 1645 2645 347 
wage and hours of work] (76.0%) (75.7%) (76.4%) (72.7%) 
Female M Respondents Married Unmarried 
All individuals' z f rT 2063 3485" 2^1 
i m • 196 
In Labor Force2 (74.9%) (79.4%) (74.5%) (81.0%) 
Complete information on 2186 2017 
wage and hours of work� (58.7%) (66.0o/o) (57.9o/o) (69.8o/o) 
Note: 1. All individuals include all male or female available in the survey between 25 
and 60 of age. 
2. In labor force is defined as those with reported working status as working or 
unemployed. 
3. Complete information means besides stating that they are working, they also 
provide positive labor income and hours of work in the survey. The number 
shown may not be the same as in the previous section because there are 
missing values of some major variables other than wage and hours of work so 
that we have to drop them in further estimations. 
I 
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Table 3.6a Summary Statistics on observations with positive non-labor income 
Male Observations Mean St. dev. Min Max 
— 238 374.3244 404.0931 8 2560 
"rejjondents — - 147 377.5721 Tl4.1224 10 2560 
"Ntoieci 208 359.1837 388.924 8 2560 
"Quarried 30 一 479.3 491.6734 20~ 2000 
"R^tricted* 109 | 340.9927 | 331.9925 | 8 2000 
Female Observations Mean St. dev. Min Max 
"aiT 203 T90.7017 503.2181 10 5000 
respondents 162 389.5111 503.0968 “ 10 5000 ‘ 
" l ^ i e d 一 178 一375.952 487.9096 10 5000 
"ul^arried 25 495.72 602.1431 33~ 3000 
"Restricted* 123 300.1699 249.6388 10 1380 
Household non-labor income . 
Restricted* | 184 | 402.6582 369.1875 8 2000 
* refers to the sample used in Chapter 5, with 1615 observations. The sample used in 
Chapter 6 is largely similar, thus it is not repeated. 
Table 3.6b Summary Statistics of another similar dataset^  on non-labor income 
, .Sample Total Observations Mean yearly St. dev. (of 
observations with positive non-labor sample with 
non-labor income (of positive non-
income sample with labor income) 
positive non-
labor income)^ 
Marr ied sample with both of the spouse working 
Male 2625 ^ ^ 1379.67 2695.04 ‘ . 
Female 2625 375 1498.29 2508.28 
Male, working or non-working, age between 25 and 55 
Male I 3194 | 502 | 1356.47 丨 2612.61 
Note: 1. The figures above are drawn from the dataset Urban Household Survey of 
China 1999. 
2. The above mean and standard deviation are measured yearly and taken only 
from those with positive non-labor income reported. 
3. This should be compared with restricted sample in 'Male' and 'Female' 
table. 
4. This should be compared with first row in 'Male' table, but it is not a 
perfect comparison since this one includes those who are not working. 
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Table 4.1 Wage Equations for all working male and all working female 
Log Log Log Log 
male wage male wage female wage female wage 
years of education 0.0987 0.0984 0.1105 0.1106 
(0.0052)** (0.0052)** (0.0065)** (0.0065)** 
experience -0.00358 0.00821 0.02041 0.00587 
(0.00626) (0.00177)** (0.00845)* (0.00227)** 
experience squared 0.00025 -0.00034 
(0.00013)* (0.00020)+ 
married 0.1164 0.09504 0.0123 0.03952 
(0.0470)* (0.04552)* (0.0695) (Q.06956) 
divorced 0.0381 0.0020 -0.0851 -0.0569 
(0.1040) (0.1027) (0.1006) (0.1005) 
Number of -0.0043 -0.0067 -0.0819 -0.0834 
pre-school children (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0455)+ (0.0457)+ 
Number of -0.0704 -0.0912 -0.0946 -0.0694 
school-age children (0.0271)** (0.0249)** (0.0339)** (0.0294)* 
Communist 0.0875 0.0881 0.1169 0.1153 
(0.0263)** (0.0263)** (0.0307)** (0.0308)'^ * 
Minority 0.0217 0.0233 -0.0742 -0.0766 
(0.0823) (0.0815) (0.1001) (0.1014) 
Health status -0.0753 -0.0759 -0.0921 -0.0915 
(0.0160)** (0.0160)** (0.0199)** (0.0199)** 
Chengdu 0.1220 0.1229 0.1132 o T m 
(0.0329)** (0.0329)** (0.0384)** (0.0385)** 
, Chongqing -0.1456 -0.1447 -0.0766 -0.0793 
(0.0351)** (0.0352)** (0.0389)* (0.0388)* 
Haerbin -0.0793 -0.0802 -0.0467 -0.0469 
(0.0331)* (0.0330)* (0.0390) (0.0390) 
Hefei -0.0866 -0.0846 -0.0197 -0.0185 
(0.0298)** (0.0298)** (0.0380) (0.0381) 
Constant “ 0.4721 0.3890 0.0436 0A352 “ 
(0.0934)** (0.0864)** (0.1286) (0.1185) 
"observations 2989 "2989 “ 2186 2186 
"R^squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4.2 Wage equation for some different specifications 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Log Log 
„ Log Log Log Female Female Female 
Male Wage Male Wage Male Wage Wage Wage Wage 
years of education 0.1028 0.0949 0.0655 0.1165 0.1003 0.0581 
(0.0047)** (0.0053)** (0.0058)** (0.0058)** (0.0066)** (0.0070)** 
Experience 0.00917 0.00928 0.00685 0.00677 0.00786 0.00456 
(0.00124)** (0.00178)** (0.00175)** (0.00174)** (0.00225)** (0.00224)* 
Married 0.1109 0.1092 0.0471 0.0473 
(0.0456)* (0.0448)* (0.0683) (0.0646) 
Divorced 0.0118 0.0183 -0.0453 -0.0266 
(0.1006) (0.0936) (0.0978) (0.0952) 
Number of -0.0048 -0.0017 -0.0847 -0.0784 
pre-school children (0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0456)+ (0.0443)+ 
Number of -0.0889 -0.0656 -0.0599 -0.0441 
school-age children (0.0248)** (0.0244)** (0.0293)* (0.0281) 
Communist 0.0884 0.0448 0.1143 0.0576 
(0.0263)** (0.0264)+ (0.0306)** (0.0299)+ 
Minority 0.0119 -0.0018 • -0.0732 -0.0415 
(0.0816) (0.0787) (0.1004) (0.1024) 
Health status -0.0761 -0.0704 -0.0926 -0.0820 
(0.0159)** (0.0154)** (0.0198)** (0.0188)** 
Chengdu 0.1156 0.0983 0.0879 0.0438 
(0.0331)** (0.0328)** (0.0380)* (0.0362) 
Chongqing -0.1504 -0.1549 -0.0951 -0.1196 
• (0.0353)** (0.0345)** (0.0384)* (0.0369)** 
Haerbin -0.0817 -0.0773 -0.0543 -0.0690 
(0-0329)* (0.0317)* (0.0389) (0.0377)+ 
- Hefei -0.0841 -0.1111 -0.0282 -0.0546 
(0.0298)** (0.0289)** (0.0380) (0.0358) 
father's education 0.0793 0.0631 0.1047 0.0523 
Dummy ^ (0.0278)** (0.0272)* (0.0315)** (0.0304)+ 
mother's education 0.0442 0.0343 0.1287 0.1002 
Dummy (0.0315) (0.0310) (0.0341)** (0.0330)** 
employment 
unit=state . -0.3074 -0.1431 
(0.0561)** (0.0701)* 
employment 
unit=collective -0.6169 -0.3795 
(0.0655)** (0.0767)** 
employment 
unit=local -0.2878 -0.0578 
(0.0699)** (0.0879) 
employment 
unit=private -0.4726 -0.3726 
Business (0.0682)** (0.0785)** 
employment unit=sole -0.4970 -0.4202 
Proprietors |(0.0741)** (0.0856)** 
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“ Occupation: |0.1493 |0.3471 
Technical personnel (0.0282)** (0.0343)** 
Occupation: 0.2588 0.3347 
Heads of units - (0.0419)** (0.0683)** 
Occupation: 0.1737 0.2217 
Managers (0.0299)** (0.0342)** 
Constant 0.1792 0.3646 1.0364 -0.1664 0.1589 0.8301 
(0.0738)* (0.0861)** (0.1024)** (0.0906)+ (0.1169) (0.1350)** 
Observations 2991 2989 2983 2186 2186 一2184 
反-squared |o.l4 |o.l7 |o.22 |o.l5 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses • 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
r 
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Table 4.3 Wage Equations for some subsamples 
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married 
Log Male Log Male Log Female Log Female 
, wage Wage wage Wage 
Years of education 0.0702 0.0964 0.0542 0.1050 
(0.0202)** (0.0055)** (0.0231)* (0.0068)** 
Experience -0.00107 0.00971 0.00312 0.00851 
(0.00587) (0.00185)** (0.00859) (0.00233)** 
Divorced 0.1233 0.0038 
(0.1370) (0.1638) 
Number of 0.0030 -0.0659 
Pre-school children (0.0420) (0.0461) 
Number of -0.0886 -0.0566 
School-age children (0.0250)** (0.0301)+ 
Number of children 0.1853 -0.1198 
below 18 (0.1801) (0.1315) 
Communist -0.0125 0.0932 0.1023. 0.1126 
(0.0765) (0.0281)** (0.1253) (0.0317)** 
Minority 0.0318 “ -0.0994 
(0.0817) (0.1013) 
Health Status -0.1390 -0.0667 -0.0804 -0.0937 
(0.0418)** (0.0171)** (0.0756) (0.0205)** 
Chengdu 0.0217 0.1281 0.2750 0 0 7 ^ 
(0.1016) (0.0351)** (0.1554)+ (0.0391)* 
Chongqing -0.2521 -0.1389 -0.0426 -0.0930 
• (0.1305)+ (0.0369)** (0.1374) (0.0401)* 
Haerbin -0.2587 -0.0702 0.0548 -0.0576 
(0.1100)* (0.0345)* (0.1288) (0.0409) 
Hefei -0.0457 -0.0896 0.0401 -0.0339 
(0.0737) (0.0327)** (0.1345) (0.0395) 
Father's education 0.1051 0.0780 0.2499 0.0895 
Dummy • (0.0702) (0.0308)* (0.1067)* (0.0332)** 
Mother's education 0.0369 0.0480 0.2099 0.1216 
Dummy (0.0688) (0.0357) (0.1079)+ (0.0361)** 
Constant 0.9254 0.4172 0.6090 0.1428 
(0.3067)** (0.1025)** (0.3642)+ (0.1250) 
Observations 2643 一 169 2017 
l^quared 0.15 0 18 0.22 0.19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Children are group together for unmarried because few observations report having 
children. 
Minority is also not entered because of very small size reporting 1 for minority in single 
subgroup. 
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Table 4.4 Some special specifications for Respondent subgroup 
(a) ‘ 
Log Male Wage equation ~1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year of education 0.0848 0.0645 0.0555 0.0551 
： (0.0075)** (0.0082)** (0.0077)** (0.0078)** 
experience 0.00769 0.01010 
(0.00238)** (0.00237)** 
Actual work experience -0.00264 0.01138 
(0.00739) (0.00220)** 
Actual work experience squared 0.00035 
(0.00017)* 
Foreign Language 0.0357 0.0362 0.0381 
(0.0080)** (0.0082)** (0.0081)** 
Putonghua 0.0716 0.0698 0.0683 
(0.0176)** (0.0175)** (0.0175)** 
Constant 0.4692 0.1770 0.3858 0.2948 
(0.1138)** (0.1212) (0.1226)** (0.1126)** 
Observations 1629 ~ 1629 • 一 1629 
"R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 一 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% “ 
^ 
Log Female Wage Equations 7*5) (6) (7) (8) 
Year of education 0.0905 0.0664 0.0512 0.0530 
(0.0088)** (0.0091)** (0.0085)** (0.0084)** 
experience 0.00765 0.01216 
. (0.00283)** (0.00289)** 
Actual work experience 0.03263 0.01605 
(0.01017)** (0.00256)** 
Actual work experience squared -0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Foreign Language 0.0519 0.0573 0.0554 
(0.0088)** (0.0089)** (0.0087)** 
Putonghua 0.0497 0.0453 0.0455 
(0.0212)* (0.0210)* (0.0210)* 
Constant 0.2728 -0.0818 0.0026 0.0757 
• (0.1493)+ (0.1596) (0.1439) (0.1372) 
Observations 1361 “ 1355 — 1355 1355 
"R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.22 — 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Other regressors included in previous models are included in the models above. 
These include marital status (married, divorced), number of children (pre-school and 
school age), communist, minority, health status, city dummies and parents' education. 
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Table 4.5a Individual Hours of Work Equation, all working male 
^ a l e Hours of Work (1) (2) 」 (3) (4) 
— "OLS IV(GMM) OLS I V ( G M I ^ 
Log(male wage)# -35.476 -27.391 -35.833 -22.577 
： (2.120)** (10.390)** (2.119)** (11.191)* 
Other household income/1000# 6.295 10.736 
(1.667)** (7.758) 
Own non-labor income/1000# -11.007 -83.360 
(7.128) (65.044) 
Spouse total income/1000 7.030 5.172 
(1.719)** (2.242)* 
Married 5.809 2.084 5.186 5.531 
(3.714) (6.531) (3.726) (3.792) 
Divorced -0.106 -0.061 1.880 11.882 
(9.981) (10.068) (10.225) (13.849) 
Age -0.158 -0.249 -0.130 -0.149 
(0.129) (0.141)+ (0.128) (0.161) 
Presence of pre-school Children -5.046 -5.036 -5.186 -6.506 
(3.018)+ (3.030)+ (3.015)+ (3.143)* 
Presence of school-age Children -5.523 -4.458 -5.649 -5.324 
(2.004)** (2.228)* (2.0.02)** (2.284)* 
Presence of Parent -2.801 -1.284 -2.712 -1.877 
(2.196) (2.547) (2.196) (2.455) 
Year of education 1.531 0.515 1.555 0.823 
(0.372)** (0.937) (0.370)** (0.834) 
Health status -4.248 -3.583 -4.243 -3.261 
^ (1.189)** (1.368)** (1.192)** (1.493)* 
“ Chengdu -0.742 -1.634 -0.837 -2.384 
(2.433) (2.575) (2.438) (2.789) 
Chongqing -1.896 -0.447 -2.473 -3.406 
(2.783) (3.226) (2.776) (3.621) 
Haerbin 2.657 3.407 1.977 0.500 
(2.645) (2.785) (2.637) (3.556) 
Hefei -5.263 -4.227 -5.603 -6.056 
(2.208)* (2.474)+ (2.200)* (2.645)* 
Employment unit = state unit -11.890 -10.810 -11.760 -10.251 
： (2.556)** (2.685)** (2.556)** (2.814)** 
Employment unit = collective unit -15.283 -11.254 -14.959 -8.449 
(4.188)** (5.825)+ (4.177)** (6.572) 
Employment unit = private business 11.099 14.855 11.750 18.320 
(4.439)* (5.175)** (4.441)** (6.117)** 
Employment unit: sole proprietor 36.395 38.828 36.971 44.097 
Firms ： (4.787)** (6.011)** (4.785)** (7.196)** 
Constant 247.486~246.149 247 .294233 .720 
(7.491)** (13.363)** (7.528)** (13.696”* 
Observations 2989 2989 2989 2989 
Uncompensated Wage Elasticity -0.184 -0.142 “ -0.186 -0.117 — 
Robust standard errors in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
For (2) and (4), log wage and household other income/own non-labor income (marked with #) are 
treated as endogenous. The instrumental variables excluded in the regression include third order 
polynomials of age and education, parents education dummies, communist party membership and ethnic 
minority. 
Elasticities are evaluated at means of the sample used in the regressions. 
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Table 4.5b Individual Hours of Work Equation, all working female 
• (5) I (6) (7) {S) 
Female hours of work OLS IV(GMM) OLS IV(GMM) 
Log(female wage)# -54.294 -16.550 -36.545 -10.122 
(3.282)** (13.243) (2.349)** (12.138) 
Other household income/1000# 24.008 10.919 
(4.138)** (13.339) 
Own non-labor income/1000# 6.600 -6.228 
(10.906) (41.698) 
Spouse total income/1000 3.818 1.259 
(0.895)** (1.507) 
Married -1.073 -0.234 -5.548 -1.778 
(4.065) (4.464) (4.762) (5.696) 
Divorced 7.247 11.318 6.533 11.429 
(6.570) (7.731) (7.348) (8.095) 
S M 0.029 0.285 0.163 
(0.156) (0.197) (0.151)+ (0.230) 
Year of education -2.789 -2.033 -4.411 -3.092 
(2.882) (3.319) (3.050) • (3.330) 
Year of education square 0.196 0.066 0.266 0.122 
(0.120) (0.157) (0.126)* (0.154) 
Presence of pre-school Children -3.169 -1.919 -3.523 -2.371 
(2.870) (3.179) (3.093) (3.274) 
Presence of school-age Children 0.663 0.815 -0.600 -0.170 
(1.930) (2.537) (2.099) (2.340) 
Presence of Parent -1.237 -0.605 -2.104 -1.323 
(2.156) (2.779) (2.336) (2.535) 
‘ Health Status -4.269 -2.037 -4.318 -2.122 
(1.303)** (1.611) (1.381)** (1.682) 
Chengdu 1.812 -2.045 -1.590 -3.855 
‘ (2.616) (3.470) (2.777) (3.250) 
Chongqing 4.973 5.765 2.118 3.604 
(3.001)+ (4.270) (3.234) (3.891) 
Haerbin “ 1.100 1.994 -0.092 0.950 
(2.421) (2.843) (2.584) (3.169) 
Hefei 4.027 3.766 2.757 2.813 
(2.435)+ (2.834) (2.586) (2.809) 
Employment unit = state unit ‘ -3.527 -2.408 -6.329 -4.098 
(2.620) (3.334) (2.927)* (3.099) 
Employment unit = collective unit -15.082 -6.415 -17.412 -8.148 
(3.456)** (5.544) (3.765)** (5.438) 
Employment unit = private 7.751 18.913 7.722 18.150 
Business (4.230)+ (6.277)** (4.612)+ (6.491)** 
Employment unit= sole proprietor 41.258 59.546 47.873 62.028 
Firms (5.218)** (8.009)** (5.614)** (7.877)** 
Constant 253.607 215.292 256.434 219.407 
(18.181)** (24.194)** (19.781)** (25.607)** 
"observations 2186 2186 2186 2186 
"uncompensated Wage Elasticity -0.283 |-0.086 -0.190 "3o.Q53 
Robust standard errors in brackets + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
For (2) and (4), log wage and household other income /own non-labor income (marked with #) are treated as 
endogenous. The instrumental variables excluded in the regression include up to third order polynomial of 
age and education, parents education dummies, communist party membership and ethnic minority. 
Elasticities are evaluated at means of the sample used in the regressions. 
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Table 4.5c Some tests results 
"Equation Number |(2) 丨（4) (6) | (8) 
Tests Male Male Female Female 
Overidentifying restriction test - J Statistic 10.14 8.54 2.37 3.11 
p-value 0.26 0.38 0.94 0.87 
Test for exogeneity of log wage and unearned 
income' -- Wu-Hausman F Stat 0.28 0.61 5.72 2.91 
p-value 0.75 0.54 0.00 0.05 
Test of exogeneity of spousal income and 
children variables^ --C Statistics 1.33 2.73 0.16 1.11 
p-value 0.51 0.43 0.92 0.77 
Test of Equality of diff. income - Chi-square 
statistics 1.87 0.03 
P value 0.17 0.86 
1. In (2) and (6), other household income, which is equal to one's own non-labor income plus 
the total income of the spouse, together with wage are treated as endogenous and are 
instrumented. In (4) and (8)，wage and own non-labor income are treated as endogenous 
while spouse's income is not. This test is to test for whether they are endogenous. 
2. In (2) and (6)，it tests for exogeneity of school age and pre-school children. In (4) and (8)， 
it tests for exogeneity of spouse's total income as well as exogeneity of school age and pre-
school children. 
3. This tests for equality of coefficient of own non-labor income and spouse total income. 
Note: Excluded dummies 
‘ Excluded dummy (base group) for city is Wuhan. Excluded dummies for employment unit is 
limited liability companies financed by local residents or foreign companies. 
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Table 4.6 Estimated hours of work equations for other sub-samples 
Unmarried Married Unmarried Married 
Male Male Female Female 
log (own wage)# 14.528 -32.916 -34.652 -22.285 
: (26.478) (9.692)** (17.181)* (10.786)* 
own non-labor income/1000# -35.344 -67.182 -10.316 18.241 
(68.609) (56.511) (58.601) (51.723) 
spouse's total income/1000# 9.813 -0.670 
(4.629)* (5.439) 
Divorced -6.576 19.671 
(15.635) (12.025) 
0.159 -0.077 -0.735 o T ^ 
(0.557) (0.155) (0.552) (0.265) 
year of education -0.896 1.118 0.064 -4.751 
(2.520) (0.798) (1.818) (3.520) 
Presence of pre-school children -6.414 -3.592 
(3.071)* (3.361) 
Presence of school age children -5.970 -0.881 
(2.250)** (2.225) 
Presence of children below 17 -6.664 -7.879 • 
(29.956) (12.181) 
Presence of parent 1.124 -1.454 -3.225 -3.241 
(9.638) (2.460) (12.864) (2.682) 
Health status 7.839 -4.617 -7.388 -2.961 
(4.750)+ (1.396)** (5.010) (1.646)+ 
Chengdu -1.767 -2.497 2.868 -1.142 
^ (8.092) (2.892) (10.449) (3.444) 
Chongqing 24.060 -6.283 8.248 3.887 
(13.441)+ (3.436)+ (10.538) (3.790) 
Haerbin 34.910 -1.468 14.202 0.178 
(18.116)+ (3.319) (8.570)+ (3.463) 
Hefei 3.345 -8.357 5.455 3.097 
； (5.805) (2.852)** (10.719) (2.832) 
Employment unit = state unit -2.266 -11.749 -0.963 -5.776 
(6.754) (2.987)** (13.653) (2.974)+ 
Employment unit = collective -1.799 -11.048 -25.001 -12.491 
Unit (14.873) (6.438)+ (16.603) (4.835)** 
Employment unit = private 28.616 15.108 11.998 10.694 
Enterprise (10.826)** (6.038)* (15.339) (5.957)+ 
Employment unit: sole 28.203 42.437 18.882 57.713 
proprietor firms (14.321)* (6.795)** (20.001) (7.241)** 
Constant 151.024 251.768 273.846 241.356^ 
(41.557)** (11.703)** (39.890)** (22.208)** 
Observations 346 “ 2640 — 169 2016 




Male Male Female Female 
Single Married Single Married 
Overidentifying restrictions --J 
Statistic " 4.38 17.45 10.29 12.68 
p-value q ^ q ^ y ? 0.47 
Exogeneity test of children 
variables 0.02 3.08 0.06 0.42 
P-value q ^ 0.81 
Test of Equality of different 
income(chi2)C statistic 1.83 0.12 
p-value 0.18 | 0.73 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Here all wage and unearned income variables (those marked with #) are treated as 
endogenous. 
The instrumental variables excluded in the regression include up to third order 
polynomial of age and education, parents education dummies, communist party 
membership and ethnic minority. 
For married sample, the age, education and parents' education of the spouse are also 
entered as extra instruments. 
Elasticities are evaluated at means of the sample used in the regressions. 
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Table 4.7 Hours of work equations for some special specifications 
Male Hours of W o r k ⑴ （2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (own wage) -19.564-29.716 -12.759-6.761 -12.581 
(19.328) (25.098) (11.709) (12.666) (11.445) 
Own non-labor income/1000 59.355 39.904 77.957 45.692 80.661 
(92.294) (101.102) (79.089) (83.264) (72.549) 
Spouse's total income/1000 4.588 5.977 3.374 2.286 3.322 
(3.977) (4.696) (2.915) (2.990) (2.916) 
Putonghua 2.385 
(2.237) 
Foreign Language 0.346 
(1.090) • 
Actual work experience 0.297 
(0.628) 
Actual work experience square -0.017 
(0.016) 
"Observations 1643 1629 1629 1629 1629 
Over-Ident. Rest. Test -- J Stat. ^ S M 8.59 T ^ 8?^ 
P-value 0.35 0.43 0.57 0.66 0.73 
Exogeneity of actual work . 
experience 一 C stat. 0.25 
P-value 0.88 
"Uncompensated Wage Elasticity -0.102 -0.155 -0.066 -0.035 -0.065 
"Female Hours of W o r k 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 1(4) 1(5) 
Log (own wage) -18.964 -21.708 -16.848-16.505 -22.208 
‘ (15.951) (16.965) (9.712)+ (10.028)+ (8.990)* 
Own non-labor income/1000 26.081 21.608 32.426 31.052 4.267 
(54.456) (55.918) (46.805) (49.258) (43.018) 
Spouse's total income/1000 -0.954 -0.431 -1.275 -1.185 0.125 
(3.932) (3.974) (2.608) (2.662) (2.392) 
Putonghua 2.774 
； (1.631)+ 
Foreign Language -0.300 
(1.045) 
Actual work experience • -0.472 
(0.841) 
Actual work experience square -0.006 
(0.019) 
"observations 1361 一 1355 — 1355 ‘ 1355 1355 
一 Over-Ident. Rest. Test - J Stat. t ! ^ ^ 10.40 13.19 
P-value 0.43 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.28 
Exogeneity of actual work 
experience - C stat. 3.17 
P-value 0.21 
"Uncompensated Wage Elasticity -0.099 -0.114 -0.088 -0.086 ~ -0.116 “ 
Robust standard errors in brackets + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
1. The above is just part of the results. The full specifications are the same as in previous ones. 
2. Log wage and own non-labor income are treated as endogenous and are instrumented as in 
previous specifications. Putonghua and Foreign Language are added to the excluded instrument in 
(3), (4) and (5). Actual work experience and its square are also added as an excluded instrument. 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics for variables used in Chapter 5 
Variable Mean Std.deviation M i n M a x 
"Men's Hours of work 187.969 42.429 — 21.5 430 
Women's Hours of work 186.607 — 42.057" 21.5 430 
Male's wage 6.055 “ 4.748 0.332 66.445 
Female's wage 4.660 — 3.604 0.233 53.156 
l ^ (ma l e ’ s wage) 1 . 6 ^ 0.622 -1.102 4.196一 
log(female's wage) 1.408 — 0.63~ -1.459 3.973 
log(male's wage) x log (female's wage) 2.574 1.815 -1.648 16.673 
total non-labor income 45.876 178.415 — 0 2000 
diff. in non-labor income，male-female 0.153 “ 140.25^ • -1380 2000 
diff in years of education, male-female 0.332 2.286 -8 10 
Sex ratio 1.049 ~ 0.15?" 0.645 1.571 
Men's year of education 12.412 2.512 6 18 
Men's age 40.446 “ 7 . 1 ^ 25 60 
liTen's health 2.31^" 0.737 1 5~ 
female's year of education 12.081 2.257 ^ 18 
"female's age 38.307 7.184 25 59 
female's health 2.394 “ O . tTT 1 5 
presence of parent dummy 0.230 0.421 0 1 
presence of pre-school children dummy 0.173 0.379 0 1 
presence of school age children dummy 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Chengdu 0.160 “ 0.367" 0 1 
Chongqing 0.143 0.350 “ 0 1 
Haerbin 0.193 一 0.394~ 0 1 
. Hefei — 0.160 — 0.366" 0 — 1 
men's working unit: state unit 0.697 0.460 0 1 
men's working unit: collective unit 0.077 0.267 0 1 
- men's working unit: private unit 0.061 0.240 0 1 
men's working unit: sole proprietorship 0.080 0.271 0 1 
women's working unit: state unit 0.630 0.483 0 1 
women's working unit: collective unit 0.120 0.325 ^ 1 
women's working unit: private unit 0.071 0.257 0 1 
women's working unit: sole proprietorship 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Fluency of foreign language 6.371 2.467 4 16 
Fluency of Putonghua 2.710 1.040 1 5 
communist party membership 0.251 0.434 0 1 
ethnic minority 0.015 0.121 0 1 
men's father education dummy 0.301 0.459 0 1 
men's mother education dummy 0.184 0.388 0 1 
women's father education dummy - 0.324 0.468 0 1 
women's mother education dummy 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Total Number of Observations 1615 
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Table 5.2 Unrestricted Model of Household Labor Supply 
Unrestricted Model Male Female 
Constant **214.9800**209.8700 
(24.1800) (26.3660) 
Log(male wage) "-37.4270 -18.6550 
(17.6920) (13.2520) 
Log(female wage) -7.5577 -28.6060 
(19.3680) (22.9720) 
Log(male wage) x log(female wage) 5.1583 2.6544 
(9.7591) (10.4520) 
Total non-labor income /1000 -31.1880 *-68.5910 
(45.0490) (37.4680) 
diff. in non-labor income, male-female, /1000 -35.5910 103.0600 
(73.5830) (81.8850) 
diff in yr o f education, male-female -1.1380 1.9445 
(0.8135) (0.8853) 
sex ratio 8.0374 -4.9101 
(6.2713) (5.4054) 
year o f education *2.6350 **3.7925 
(1.4605) (1.2913) 
Age 0.2681 »*0.5200 
(0.2463) (0.2606) . 
health status -2.6141 *-2.7132 
(1.6181) (1.4666) 
presence o f parents **-5.8513 -3.6915 
(2.6195) (2.4256) 
presence of pre-school children -3.7402 *-5.1592 
. (3.3519) (3.1297) 
' presence of school-age children -3.7753 -2.6283 
(3.0015) (2.6537) 
Chengdu 0.4106 -0.6481 
- (3.5433) (2.9731) 
Chongqing *-6.3424 -5.2380 
(3.6867) (3.5831) 
Haerbin “ -4.1652 -4.7385 
(4.0867) (3.5549) 
Hefei -5.0206 -0.0870 
(3.0934) (2.9172) 
state unit • **-l 1.8850**-12.2090 
(3.8395) (3.3332) 
collective unit -6.4308**-16.0830 
(6.4066) (5.0836) 
sole proprietor unit **35.1380 **39.328 
(8.1479) (6.7354) 
private unit 7.9259 6.6557 
(7.1927) (5.7262) 
Sample Size 1615 
Note: Asymptotic Standard errors in parentheses, 
•significant at 10%, *significant at 5% 
In the above estimation, log(male wage), log(female wage), cross log wage, household 
non-labor income and difference in non-labor income are treated as endogenous. The instrumental 
variables excluded in the regression include: second and third order polynomials of age and 
education, parents' education, communist membership and ethnic minority. 
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Table 5.3 Some test results 
Tests on unrestricted model Test statistics Degree of freedom p-value 
(X2 statistics) 
Overidentifying restrictions (J statistics) 41.9330 38 0.3042 
Wald Test on all distribution factors 11.2650 6 0.0805 
Newey-West test on Pareto Efficiency 1.932 2 0.3806 
Newey-West test on collective model 0.979 3 0.8060 
r 
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Table 5.4 Restricted Collective Model 
Male Female 
**214.92 "203.59 
Constant (15.047) (20.997) 
**-37.804 -14.013 
Log(male wage) “ (12.253) (10.818) 
-1.2374 -13.077 
Log(female wage) (9.9917) (19.021) 
2.1208 -3.9575 
Log(male wage)xlog(female wage) (4.1049) (7.7764) 
-34.485 *-73.712 
Total non-labor income /1000 (32.103) (39.793) 
-51.688 96.452 
diff. in non-labor income, male-female /I OOP (32.533) (69.588) 
. • **-1.1955 **2.2307 
diff in year of education, male-female (0.57496) (0.87868) 
•4.6772 *-8.7277 
sex ratio (2.7648) (4.7934) 
**3.0855 **3.7603 
Year of education (1.1478) “ (1.3082) 
0.30739 *0.49279 
Age (0.19529) (0.28217) 
~••-3.3836 -2.5427 ‘ 
Health status (1.5646) (1.5729) 
**-6.2957 M.3641 
presence of parents (2.3946) (2.5013) 
-4.3252 *-5.821 
presence of pre-school children (3.0126) (3.3174) 
**-5.5665 -3.8795 
.. presence of school-age children (2.5056) (2.728) 
0.0629 -1.4096 
Chengdu (3.1158) (2.9488) 
**-8.0468 *-6.8149 
‘ Chongqing (3.3448) (3.7799) 
*-5.6139 *-6.3375 
Haerbin (3.4086) (3.6936) 
“ **-6.6817 -2.0182 
Hefei (2.7953) (3.1716) 
“ **-12.177 1.991 
State unit (3.7482) (3.6234) 
‘ -7.0099 **-14.951 
collective unit (6.2421) (5.6476) 
**34.747 *M1.74 
sole proprietor unit (7.6404) (7.2521) 
“ 7.8008 9.5355 
private unit (6.7382) (5.9704) 
Sample Size- 1615 
Note: Asymptotic Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ^significant at 5% 
In the above estimation, log(male wage), log(female wage), cross log wage, household 
non-labor income and difference in non-labor income are treated as endogenous. The instrumental 
variables excluded in the regression include: second and third order polynomials of age and 
education, parents' education, communist membership and ethnic minority. 
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Table 5.5a Sharing Rule Coefficient 
Sharing Rule Parameters(for husband)/1000 yuan 
- -0.1015 
log (male wage) (0.1022) 
0.0167 
log (female wage) (0.1322) 
-0.0287 
log(male wage) x log(female wage) (0.0579) 
•0.4661 
Household non-labor income /1000 (0.2585) . 
•0.0162 
Difference in education, male - female (0.0097) 
0.6986 
Difference in non-labor income, male - female /1000 (0.5593) 
-0.0632 
Sex ratio (0.0474) 
Note: *Significant at 10% level. 
Asymptotic standard errors are shown in the parentheses. 
For a sharing rule in terms of yuan, we should multiply the above coefficients by 
1000 except for those non-labor income terms. 
Table 5.5b Marginal effects 
Marg ina l effect of changes in Change in husband's share 
in yuan 
• One yuan increase in husband's wage -23.428 
One yuan increase in wife's wage -6.715 
One yuan increase in husband's non-labor income 
‘ (holding wife's non-labor income constant) 1.165 
One yuan increase in wife's non-labor income 
(holding husband's non-labor income constant) -0.233 
One year higher for husband's education (holding 
wife's education constant) 16.157 
One percent increase in sex ratio -0.632 
Note: The wage effect is evaluated at sample mean. 
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics of major variables used in Chapter 6 
Variables Mean St. deviation ^ ^ Max 
l ^ n ' s Hours of work 一 187.93T" 42.448 21.5 430 
"women's Hours of work 186.567 42.074 — 21.5 “ 430 
Men's clothing expenditure 65.252 88.369 0 1666.667 
Women's clothing expenditure 87.501 — 111.474 0 2500 
" ^ e wage _ 6.537 5.195" 0.332 66.445— 
Female wage 5.000 3.844 — 0.233 53.156 
Total non-labor income 45.956 一 178.672 0 2000.000 
diff. in non-labor income，male-female 0.091 140.454 -1380 2000.000 
diff in years of education, male-female 0.331 2.288 -8 10 
sex ratio 1.049 0.157 — . 0.645 1.571 
Men's year of education 12.410 2.514 6 
Men's age 40.454 7.184 “ 26 60 
Men's health 2.312 “ 0.738~ 1 5 
Female's year of education 12.079 2.256 6 18 
Female's age 38.314 “ 7 .17^ 25 59 
Female's health 2.394 0.711 1一 5~ 
presence of parent dummy 0.371 0.732 0 4 
presence of pre-school children dummy 0.173 0.380 0 2 
presence of school age children dummy 0.474 0.515 0 2 
Chengdu 0.161 ~ 0.368 o" 1 
Chongqing 0.143 ~ 0.351 o" 1 
Haerbin 0.191 “ 0.393~ 0 1 
— 0.1 6T 0.366 0 1 
Log(total parental marriage expenditure) 7.999 3.262 0 11.883 
difference in parental expenditure at marriage 1.752 5.776 -45.675 49 
Men's occupation: Technical personnel 0.225 0.418 0_ 1 
Men's occupation: Heads of units 0.099 0.298 0 1 
Men's occupation: Managers 0.224 0.417 0 1 
Men's occupation: Production workers 0.276 0.447 0 1 
Women's occupation: Technical personnel 0.190 0.392 0 T 
Women's occupation: Heads of units 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Women's occupation: Managers 0.242 0.428 0 1 
Women's occupation: Production workers 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Fluency of foreign language 6.367 2.467 4 — 16 
Fluency of Putonghua • 2.712 1.039 1 — 5 
communist party membership 0.252 0.434 0 T 
ethnic minority 0.014 0.119 “ 0 1 
men's father education dummy 0.301 0.459 0 T 
men's mother education dummy 0.183 0.387 0 T 
Women's father education dummy 0.324 0.468 0 1 
Women's mother education dummy 0.220 0.415 0 1 
Total number of observations 1610 
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Table 6.2 Unrestricted Model Full Sample 
Men's Women's Men's log Women's 
Hours of Hours of clothing log clothing 
work Work expenditure expenditure 
**242.0444**241.2093 **3.7401 **3.3504 
Constant ； (13.6076) (14.5893) (0.4598) (0.3869) 
**-36.4248**-19.9174 *0.5440 •*0.9280 
log(male wage) (10.9568) (9.7097) (0.2871) (0.2618) 
1.7484~~**-22.5836 **0.9506 **0.9852 
log(female wage) (7.1632) (10.8194) (0.2172) (0.2616) 
12.0327 *-65.9576 **2.2011 0.8861 
total non-labor income/1000 (33.5556) (37.5158) (1.0661) (0.9964) 
*-102.2174 *121.6066 -0.3968 -1.5632 
difference in non-labor income/1000 (58.3844) (69.0269) (1.9757) (1.7824) 
-0.9101 **1.8720 *0.0418 -0.0225 
difference in education (0.7140) (0.8399) (0.0227) (0.0235) 
-0.7068 -0.5700 •*0.0307 -0.0019 
difference in age (0.4909) (0.4788) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
difference in parental expenditure at 0.1174 -0.0110~ ~ 0.0066 -0.0013 
marriage/1000 (0.1729) (0.1638) (0.0042) (0.0047) 
7.5222 -5.0163 -0.2780 0.0153 
sex ratio (5.8573) (6.0649) (0.1888) (0.1827) 
1.4390 *2.3402 -0.0424 -0.0400 
year of education (1.1800) (1.2486) (0.0343) (0.0316) 
0.0098 0.2707 **-0.0375 **-0.0364 
Age (0.2310) (0.2727) (0.0072) (0.0065) 
**-5.1026 -2.1973 *0.0602 0.0153 
health status (1.6552) (1.6689) (0.0339) (0.0379) 
• *-2.4071 **-2.5791 0.0493 **0.0707 
Number of parents (1.4047) (1.2832) (0.0385) (0.0350) 
*-5.5522 -3.4281 -0.1328 -0.1282 
. Number of pre-school children (3.3640) (3.3397) (0.0893) (0.0842) 
-1.7848 -0.9647 -0.0409 0.0471 
Number of school-age children (2.6538) (2.7023) (0.0744) (0.0693) 
4.4726 2.0511 **0.2200 0.0099 
Chengdu ； (3.4879) (3.0690) (0.0920) (0.0857) 
-3.3552 -3.5442 •0.1791 0.1251 
Chongqing (3.3795) (3.7588) (0.0973) (0.0921) 
• -1.6531 -3.7065 **0.2342 ••0.2569 
Haerbin (3.6508) (3.5777) (0.1022) (0.1009) 
**-6.1484 1.0534 0.0177 0.0147 
Hefei (3.0129) (3.3411) (0.0903) (0.0864) 
Log(total parental marriage 0.2477 -0.4581 *0.0225 0.0173 
expenditure) (0.4058) (0.4098) (0.0120) (0.0113) 
*-7.1873 *-8.7377 0 . 0 8 4 0 . *-0.1726 
Occupation: Technical personnel (4.1822) (4.8136) (0.0954) (0.1010) 
-3.3257 -8.7919 *0.2247 0.1344 
Occupation: Heads of units (4.7273) (5.7791) (0.1136) (0.1401) 
*M2.7814 **-9.6325 *0.1765 -0.1320 
Occupation: Managers (4.4448) (4.0402) (0.0997) (0.0822) 
**-12.2081•*-18.7050 -0.0553 -0.0935 
Occupation: Production workers (3.7424) (3.4929) (0.0829) (0.0811) 
Total Number of Observations 1610 
Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. **significant at 5%, .significant at 10% 
Wage and non-labor income variables are treated as endogenous. The instrumental variables 
excluded in the regression are the same as in the previous chapter. 
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Table 6.3 Some tests results on the unrestricted model 
Test statistics Degree of p-value 
(义2 statistics) freedom 
Overidentifying restrictions (J statistics) 79.7016 76 0.3634 
Wald Test on all distisbution Factors 42.7890 200.0022 
Newey West Test on Pareto Efficiency 17.106 12~~0.1457 
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Table 6.4 Restricted Model 
Women's Men's log Women's 
Men's Hours Hours of clothing log clothing 
of work Work expenditure expenditure 
**237.5176**237.5216 **3.5366 **3.1950 
Constant ； (11.5404) (10.6579) (0.4046) (0.3040) 
"-36.4476 *-12.8862 *0.5640 **0.9149 
log(male wage) (10.0655) (6.9079) (0.2943) (0.2016) 
2.2335 **-19.6439 **0.9277 **0.9715 
log(female wage) (5.7535) (8.6170) (0.2004) (0.2403) 
-5.5144 -42.0491 1.5924 0.9955 
total non-labor income/1000 (29.1102) (32.1232) (1.1149) (0.9351) 
*-58.2565 42.0044 **2.6008 -0.9566 
difference in non-labor income/1000 (30.7248) (32.0172) (1.3115) (0.9250) 
••-1.0051 0.7247 **0.0449 -0.0165 
difference in education (0.4707) (0.5148) (0.0190) (0.0162) 
*-0.3940 0.2841 **0.0176 -0.0065 
difference in age (0.2177) (0.2078) (0.0087) (0.0059) 
difference in parental expenditure at -0.0754 0 . 0543“ 0.0034 -0.0012 
marriage/1000 (0.0597) (0.0508) (0.0025) (0.0013) 
*5.3733 -3.8743 **-0.2399 0.0882 
sex ratio (2.9366) (2.7971) (0.1171) (0.0788) 
1.5260 1.3289 -0.0369 -0.0357 
year of education (0.9695) (0.9613) (0.0305) (0.0267) 
0.0769 0.0795 **-0.0322 ••-0.0334 
Age (0.1946) (0.2229) (0.0065) (0.0059) 
•*-3.4758 -1.9395 **0.0807 -0.0015 
health status (1.5557) (1.4804) (0.0376) (0.0381) 
• -1.8686 **-2.6775 0.0500 **0.0778 
Number of parents (1.3440) (1.1897) (0.0388) (0.0345) 
*-5.2552 -4.8269 -0.0725 -0.0901 
. Number of pre-school children (3.0987) (2.9968) (0.0879) (0.0801) 
-2.6367 0.5154 -0.0570 0.0448 
Number of school-age children (2.4849) (2.3951) (0.0727) (0.0659) 
3.2862 2.1544 0.1227 -0.0097 
Chengdu ； (3.2165) (2.6830) (0.0948) (0.0819) 
-3.8254 -2.3751 •0.1637 0.1252 
Chongqing (3.1885) (3.2269) (0.0990) (0.0882) 
. -3.1545 -1.6960 **02\22 **0.2627 
Haerbin (3.3068) (3.2273) (0.1029) (0.0977) 
*-5.0180 2.0870 0.0261 0.0066 
Hefei (2.8129) (2.8261) (0.0904) (0.0801) 
Log(total parental marriage 0.2050 -0.2037 0.0129 0.0149 
expenditure) (0.3807) (0.3439) (0.0120) (0.0105) 
**-7.4370 •*-9.5187 0.0576 -0.1575 
Occupation: Technical personnel (3.8323) (4.0405) (0.1024) (0.1024) 
-3.5810 *-8.6864 0.1883 0.1489 
Occupation: Heads of units (4.2100) (5.0041) (0.1223) (0.1338) 
**-12.9328 **-12.1483 *0.1942 -0.1179 
Occupation: Managers (3.9751) (3.3593) (0.1058) (0.0841) 
• •-12.8740**-16.7552 -0.0777 -0.0855 
Occupation: Production workers (3.4219) (3.1431) (0.0880) (0.0776) 
Total number of observations 1610 
Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. **significant at 5%, .significant at 10% 
Wage and non-labor income variables are treated as endogenous. The instrumental variables 
excluded in the regression are the same as in the previous chapter. 
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Table 6.5 Restricted Model with household without children below 17 
Log Men's Log 
Men's Women's clothing Women's 
Hours of Hours of expenditure clothing 
: Work Work expenditure 
**221.5848**247.5736 **4.6490 ••4.2482 
Constant (20.2702) (16.6637) (0.6096) (0.4038) 
**-44.9488 *-16.4129 **0.9867 **0.7889 
log(male wage) (12.4307) (8.8088) (0.3221) (0.2136) 
-3.6630 2.9370 **0.8160 *0.4006 
log(female wage) (7.3815) (9.5252) (0.2190) (0.2230) 
*51.0009 *44.2776 ** 1:4927 0.5464 
total non-labor income/1000 (26.0131) (26.4854) (0.7256) (0.6071) 
-17.9886 -5.5785 0.4140 -0.0223 
difference in non-labor income/1000 (33.4858) (11.2322) (0.7514) (0.1140) 
**-L6677 -0.5172 *0.0384 -0.0021 
difference in education (0.7669) (0.4045) (0.0218) (0.0103) 
**-1.1463 -0.3555 *0.0264 -0.0014 
difference in age (0.5651) (0.2923) (0.0143) (0.0070) 
difference in parental expenditure at -0.0216 -0.0067 0.0005 -0.00003 
marriage/1000 (0.1693) (0.0527) (0.0039) (0.00026) 
**30.0868 9 .3303 • •-0 .6924 0.0373 
sex ratio (9.6488) (6.9118) (0.2418) (0.1829) 
Number of Observations 
Note: 
1. Specification is the same as the model presented above. The only difference is that 
there are no children dummies anymore. Age, years of education, health status, number 
" of parents, log of total marriage expenditure supported by parents, city dummies and 
occupation dummies are also entered as regressors as in previous models. 
2. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
- 3. **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
4. Wage and non-labor income variables are treated as endogenous. The instrumental 
variables excluded in the regression are the same as in the previous chapter. 
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Table 6.6a Identified Individual and Spousal Leisure 
Identified individual leisure 
Male Female 
； 80.2170 56.6556 
log(male wage) (50.1698) (48.2377) 
14.6330 **36.5104 
log(female wage) (14.3887) (16.6669) 
25.1165 61.6512 
Total non-labor income/1000 (32.0241) (40.7129) 
0.7078 -1.0221 
Difference in education, male - female (0.7558) (0.8438) 
Difference in non-labor income/1000，male- 41.0218 -59.2391 • 
female (44.4778) (51.9544) 
0.2775 -0.4007 
Difference in age, male-female (0.3056) (0.3440) 
Difference in parental expenditure at 0.0531 -0.0766 
marriage/1000, male-female (0.0671) (0.0777) 
-3.7837 5.4640 
Sex ratio (4.1551) (4.6554) 
Identified spousal leisure 
-43.7694 
log(male wage) (48.7412) 
-16.8665 
log(female wage) (14.3866) 
-19.6020 
Total non-labor income/1000 (36.0280) 
‘ 0.2974 
Difference in education, male - female (0.7432) 
Difference in non-labor income/1000, male- 17.2347 
- female (43.4679) 
0.1166 
Difference in age, male-female (0.2941) 
Difference in parental expenditure at 0.0223 
marriage/1000, male-female (0.0570) 
-1.5897 
Sex ratio (4.0084) 
Note: Asymptotic standard eiTors are shown in the parentheses. 
**significant at 5% 
Table 6.6b Marginal effects 
Marg ina l effect of changes in Husband's Wife's private Spousal 
private leisure leisure leisure 
One yuan increase in husband's wage 12.272 8.667 -6.696 
One yuan increase in wife's wage 2.926 7.301 -3.373 
One hundred yuans increase in husband's 
non-labor income (holding wife's non-labor 
income constant) 6.614 0.241 -0.237 
One hundred yuans increase in wife's non-
labor income (holding husband's non-labor 
income constant) -1.591 12.089 -3.684 
Note: The wage effect is evaluated at sample mean. 
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Appendix 
Table A. 1 Hours of work equation of unmarried people for reference to Chapter 5 
Male Female 
log (own wage) 18.739 -37.680 
: [27.588] [16.502]* 
own non-labor income -18.421 -15.830 
[72.007] [51.718] 




year of education -1.379 0.355 . 
[2.642] [1.795] 
health status 8.147 -8.381 
[4.773]+ [5.341] 
Children below 18 -8.572 -13.546 
[28.431] [12.466] 
Parent 2.233 -3.864 
[4.803] [6.4011 
Chengdu 1.874 3.572 
[8.855] [10.7311 
Chongqing 33.702 8.854 
[19.927]+ [11.4621 
Haerbin 38.160 14.796 
[18.870]* [8.602]+ 
Hefei 6.927 8.687 
[7.525] [10.514] 
Employment unit = state unit -2.518 -2.664 
[6.874] [12.502] 
Employment unit = collective unit -0.334 -26.520 
[14.890] [16.591] 
Employment unit = private enterprise 28.314 10.360 
[11.0921* [14.606] 
Employment unit= sole proprietor 27.982 16.755 
Firms [14.2781+ [20.196] 
sr3m2 -32.076 -12.780 
[41.653] 丨29.7201 
Constant 179.609 298.749 
[56.9191** [55.7351** 
Observations ^ 169 
Over-identification test -- J Statistic 4.17 9.89 
Prob 0.76 I 0.19 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Log wage and own non-labor income are treated as endogenous. 
Excluded instruments are the same as the hours of work 
equations presented in Chapter 4. 
The estimation method is GMM. 
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